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ABSTRACT 
Sharing of personal information on the Internet has become increasingly popular. In social 
media interactions users face a trade-off between the pleasure and usefulness of sharing and the 
need to protect their privacy. This study employs recent theory in the research area Human-
Computer interaction to investigate users' privacy decisions on the social networking service 
Facebook from a holistic view, including aspects like emotions, dialectics, and social and temporal 
context. The purpose is to understand user behavior in the area of privacy and the implications of 
this for interaction design as well as for education of users. The analysis reveals the interplay 
between user experiences and rational, fact-based privacy knowledge as important for users' 
privacy choices. A model for privacy literacy is proposed, and application of this model on 
empirical data uncovers experiences of privacy divergent from the users' actual privacy situation on 
Facebook. This situation may explain some lack of rationality observed in privacy decisions by 
previous research. The presentation further identifies weaknesses in privacy literacy in areas of 
current importance, as well as differences in ideas and mindsets applied in the privacy process by 
youths and adults respectively. The observations show that users may be vulnerable to privacy risks 
despite a desire to behave cautiously and responsibly online and the efforts invested to reach this 
goal. Conclusions are drawn in the form of recommendations for designers, for educators, for users, 
as well as for further research.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
I think we should share, that's why I'm in there. I think it is good thing. It has changed the 
relationships to my colleagues… I know what they are up to and what they think about this and 
that. And people that I haven't been talking to for years, I keep in touch and keep up with them. 
So, I am very fond of Facebook (#1:A1F)
1
 
The Internet has given us new and meaningful ways to engage with other people. The first social 
media applications emerged a few decades ago, and by rapid growth these have become integral parts 
of our daily lives. On social networking services like Facebook
2
, we share large amounts of 
information about our lives. We enjoy sharing; its pleasure and usefulness. Sharing of personal 
information has become increasingly popular.  
 
This new way of communicating has a trade-off, though. There is a delicate balance between the 
pleasure and usefulness of sharing and the need to protect our privacy. The concentration of personal 
information on social networking sites opens up for unauthorized use of this information. Information 
control is complicated, and even users with high awareness towards risks may experience threats to 
their privacy.  
 
Previous research on privacy has shown that user's decisions in this area are not always rational. 
Knowledge of privacy appears as an important, but insufficient factor influencing these decisions. By 
applying recent theoretical contributions within the research area of Human-Computer Interaction 
(HCI), this work will investigate users' privacy decisions from a holistic view including aspects like 
emotions, dialectics, and social and temporal context. The purpose is to find out if a more inclusive 
concept of privacy literacy, considering emotional, social, and dialectic aspects in addition to the 
rational, fact-based knowledge, can improve our understanding of users' behavior in the area of 
privacy. 
 
The remainder of this introduction will elaborate the focus of this study, present its four research 
questions, and clarify the thesis structure. 
  
                                                          
 
1 the notation used for identification of transcripts is described in the introduction to chapter 5 
2 www.facebook.com 
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1.1 Focus of this study 
This study is aimed at understanding the influence of privacy literacy on users' choices in the 
privacy area. The social networking service Facebook has been used as a case for this investigation. 
 
To understand privacy literacy, users' privacy decisions has been explored from three 
complementary perspectives: 1) in light of their rational, fact-based knowledge of privacy 
(KNOWLEDGE); 2) in light of the actual exposure of personal information resulting from these 
decisions (BEHAVIOR); and 3) in light of their general experience of privacy in interactions with 
technology (EXPERIENCE).   
 
Users' fact-based knowledge of privacy has been explored by questions like: How well do users 
understand fundamental characteristics of digital information? How do users assess the sensitivity of 
different categories of personal information? How well do users understand the mechanisms for 
information control provided by the service they interact with? And the risks associated with sharing 
of information, what are users' conceptions of these? 
 
Users' behavior has been explored by reviewing some of their actual privacy decisions and the 
consequences for exposure of personal information resulting from these. 
 
Users' emotional experience of their interactions has been explored by questions like: What 
fundamental feelings characterize users' privacy interactions; uncertainty and doubts or a sense of 
security? How do users view themselves and the information about them online; as invulnerable or as 
potentially interesting in the view of a perpetrator? What timeframe and which purposes characterize 
users' privacy decisions? 
 
18 Facebook users, nine youths and nine adults, have been interviewed about their privacy literacy. 
The interviews have focused on their rational, fact-based knowledge of privacy, but also on the 
emotions, ideas, and mindsets overarching their application of this knowledge in interactions on 
Facebook. Some of their privacy decisions on Facebook were reviewed to picture the actual exposure 
resulting from these choices. 
 
To support the work, two perspectives from the last decade of research on privacy and user 
experiences within the research area of HCI were chosen; theory particularly suited to capture the 
emotional, temporal, social, dynamic, and dialectic aspects of users' privacy related interactions: 
'Privacy for a Networked World' (Palen & Dourish, 2003) and 'Technology as Experience' (John 
McCarthy & Peter  Wright, 2004). 
 
As a result, this study proposes a model of privacy literacy. The model reflects a relation between 
knowledge, behavior, and user experiences, and is used recurrently throughout the presentation of 
3 
 
findings to mirror the weak and strong areas of privacy literacy observed. The presentation of findings 
also describe the participants' general privacy experience in interactions with Facebook; an experience 
in disharmony with their actual privacy situation. Finally, the presentation describes differences in 
ideas and mindsets between youths and adults; differences potentially important for their privacy 
decisions. 
1.2 Research questions 
The following four research questions have guided this work: 
 
RQ1: Can inadequate knowledge of privacy explain why users sometimes show non-secure 
behavior on Facebook? 
RQ2: Can users' experiences of privacy on Facebook complement the rational, fact-based 
knowledge aspects of their privacy literacy? 
RQ3: Does teens' privacy literacy on Facebook differ from adults' privacy literacy? If so, how? 
RQ4: Are some areas of the users' privacy literacy identified as weaker than others, in this way as 
candidates for improvement? 
1.3 Thesis structure 
The presentation builds on the following structure: 
 
 Chapter 2 (Background) complements the backdrop sketched in this introduction and presents 
previous research relevant for this work. The risks associated to sharing of information on the Internet 
in general and on Facebook in particular are depicted. The chapter is finalized by a presentation of the 
motivation for research. 
 
Chapter 3 (Theory) describes the theoretical perspective used as a lens for this work: a rich 
perspective for explorations of user experiences ('Technology as Experience') and another for 
investigating privacy in networked applications from a dynamic, dialectic, social, and process-based 
perspective ('Privacy for a Networked World'). Research traditions within the area of HCI are briefly 
reviewed, in order to clarify the positions of the two perspectives therein.  
 
Chapter 4 (Method) describes some basic assumptions for this study, and details the 
methodological approach chosen to support data collection and data analysis. The primary approach is 
qualitative and interpretive, yet triangulation of methods and quantitative techniques has been 
employed for a rich perspective on the phenomenon. This chapter also reviews the two pilot studies 
and the value of these for the final research design. The detailed procedures used in data analysis in the 
main study are presented in the final paragraph of the chapter, 4.4.2.5.  
4 
 
Chapter 5 (Data analysis) present the findings within each of the three perspectives used to 
understand privacy decisions; KNOWLEDGE, BEHAVIOR, and EXPERIENCE. The presentation is given by 
a combination of textual descriptions, transcripts, figures, and tables, and reflects the triangulation of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches used to reach these findings. The model of privacy literacy 
appears recurrently throughout the presentation to reflect the findings within the three complementary 
perspectives. 
 
Chapter 6 (Discussion) a discussion of findings in light of each of the four research questions will 
be found, followed by reflections on use of the chosen theoretical perspectives. These reflections point 
out some elements of the theoretical contributions which were found particularly useful for 
investigating the research questions of this study. The chapter is finalized by an evaluation of this 
work based on generally accepted criteria for assessment of scientific quality in qualitative research. 
 
Chapter 7 (Conclusions) draws conclusions from this work and present some recommendations for 
further research. 
 
This thesis is submitted June 1, 2013 to the Department of Information Science and Media Studies 
at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Bergen, Norway as partial fulfillment of the 
requirements to the degree of 'Master in Information Science'. As privacy has been theme for several 
works for my master's degree, some thoughts in this thesis may be present in other submissions for this 
degree. In this thesis, however, they are formulated for a different context. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
Social media are Internet sites where people interact freely, sharing information about each other 
and their lives. These sites appear in many forms, including blogs, social networks, wikis, virtual 
worlds and video sharing sites, and information is shared using various formats, like text, pictures, 
videos, and audio recordings (Curtis, 2013).  Today, users spend more time on social networks than 
any other category of social media sites, and services like Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook has 
become important parts of many people's everyday lives. The increasing use of mobile devices has 
been an important catalyzer for this development. Applications are used extensively, application use 
now accounts for more than one third of social networking time across PCs and mobile devices 
(Nielsen, 2012).  
 
Facebook is the most widespread social networking application on the Internet and has had an 
excessive growth since the early start in 2004. Member count as of February 2013 is 1.11 billion 
monthly active
3
 users worldwide, this number is up from 360 million users at the end of 2009 
(Facebook, 2013a). Norway has 2.72 
million
4
 Facebook users (Table 1). Many 
Norwegian users have several years of 
Facebook experience, as the most 
extensive member growth in Norway took 
place between September 2006 and the 
end of 2008
5
 (Synlighet, 2012). Users continually share more information about themselves on 
Facebook. In 'Zuckerberg's law of social sharing', the founder of Facebook describes the increase in 
sharing as developing exponentially, by a doubling every year (Tsotsis, 2011). 
2.1 Privacy on the Internet 
2.1.1 Personal integrity, identity, and information security 
Social media use opens for new and extensively popular ways for communicating, creating, and 
sharing content. At the same time, the use of these technologies challenges our control of own 
personal information. As our existences in the world of new digital technologies to a considerable 
extent are understood on the grounds of this information, privacy related aspects like personal 
integrity, information security, and the shaping of one's own online identity has become more 
important.   
                                                          
 
3 defined as a member that has logged in to the application during the last 30 days 
4 as of September, 2012 
5 1.5 million Norwegians registered for a Facebook account this period 
Age 13-17 18-24 25-34 35-54 55+ 
Female 177 880 248 540 293 280 468 080 162 380 
Male 182 240 269 960 297 960 419 460 152 760 
Total 359 840 524 020 608 200 910 500 323 140 
Table 1: Norwegian Facebook users (Synlighet, 2012) 
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 In a definition of privacy
6
 acknowledged by Norwegian government and legal authorities, 
Schartum and Bygrave (2011) describe six aspects of personal integrity. Adapting their model of 
privacy into this context, Figure 1 reflects these six denoted as: psychological integrity (protection 
against no choice-situations and emotional stress); physical integrity of body (protecting the body 
against physical harm); physical integrity of property (protecting geographical areas like home and 
property); communication integrity (protecting the right to communicate without intrusions); 
information integrity (protecting 
the right to generate, adapt, and 
manage information about 
ourselves, including the right to 
decide upon the availability of 
this information to others),  and 
contextual integrity (protecting 
our norms for the information's 
relevance in different social 
contexts). 
 
Rachels (1997) points to how the 
loss of control over personal information can violate our personal integrity by interfering with the 
process of organizing the social relations of our lives. Different behavioral patterns link to different 
types of social relations, and disclosure of information in inappropriate contexts can disrupt our system 
of social relations to other people; ’that is why the loss of privacy is so disturbing’ (Rachels, 1997, p. 
150). This view of integrity overlaps the concept of contextual integrity described by Schartum and 
Bygrave, and is closely related to the need to control the expressions for one's online identity. Identity 
is a central aspect of privacy as defined by the privacy framework chosen for this study: 'Privacy for a 
Networked World' (Palen & Dourish, 2003). This framework is further described in chapter 4.  
 
Information security issues are important for the question of privacy. Lack of security yields 
problems for the control of personal information and by this, potential problems for privacy. Users of 
social media are vulnerable to security risks due to several reasons. Years of information security 
efforts have made hacking of state-of-the-art security systems so difficult that hackers now turn to 
users and the use situation (Mathiasen & Bødker, 2008).  Social media sites are accessed from a 
variety of devices (like pc, mobile, tablets) and in different settings (like work, leisure), and this 
increased use in non-traditional settings introduces heightened risks of misuse (Iachello & Hong, 
                                                          
 
6 in Norwegian: Personopplysningsvern 
Figure 1: Six aspects of integrity (based on Schartum & Bygrave, 2011) 
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2007). Social networking services are typically designed for users to build a profile of themselves by 
concentrating personal information of various kinds on the same site. At the same time as we disclose 
increasing amounts of information about ourselves (Stutzman & Kramer-Duffield, 2010), this 
contribute to increased vulnerability for users of these services. 
 
Vulnerabilities can be utilized in various ways. Attempts of phishing
7
, in order to get access to a 
user’s confidential information (e.g. bank account information, passwords) are getting more 
sophisticated and associated problems of identity thefts
8
 increase continuously. Problems with viruses 
spreading through malware
9
 in social networks is getting more and more common, as well as scam
10
, 
where the scammers unceasingly apply new variations of techniques and disguises to get hold of other 
people’s personal information. Major and not very well known current threats for social media users, 
however, are the problems of social engineering and coupling. 
2.1.2 Social engineering and coupling of data from different sources 
Social engineering is the act of  manipulating people to reveal sensitive information or to perform 
actions they normally would not have done (NSM, 2010). Gaining confidence by manipulation can 
give the perpetrator unauthorized access to information or to computer systems. Social engineering is 
commonly a first step in a process and the final purpose may be crimes and frauds of various kinds 
(e.g. identity thefts, financial fraud, and unauthorized access to information systems). Access to 
personal information can increase a perpetrator's credibility in social engineering attemps in two ways: 
by making it easier to lure the victim herself, but also by making it easier to take on the victim's 
identity in meeting with others.  
 
Not only information traditionally seen as sensitive (like Social Security Number and bank account 
number) are utilized in social engineering, expressive information like preferences, attitudes, and 
beliefs may turn out as very useful for a perpetrator, as well. 
 
Coupling of information increases the risks for social engineering and other forms of unauthorized 
use of personal information. One, isolated piece of data about an individual may not be very revealing, 
yet combining many pieces of information can paint a portrait of the user's identity (Solove, 2008). 
Combining pieces of our online footprints can provide complete pictures of individuals, but 
unfortunately, this is not necessarily a picture recognized by the users (The Norwegian Data 
                                                          
 
7  fraud by passing oneself off as a trusted contact (bank, internet provider, etc.) 
8  taking on another person’s identity in order to gain advantages, or to impose inconvenience upon others 
9  malicious software installed on a computer without the owner’s permission., e.g. viruses, Trojans, worms, spyware,  
   adware, or other programs developed with malicious purposes in mind 
10 fraud by disguise in order to gain advantages, e.g. tricking people into handing over personal information 
8 
 
Inspectorate, 2013). Researchers have known this for some time, but these issues are not so well 
known among users in general: '…the public is coming slowly, if painfully, aware of the risks of 
combining personal information from multiple data sources'  (Iachello & Hong, 2007, p. 100). The 
findings of this study indicate that this issue is still not very highly focused by users. 
 
Research has demonstrated the power of data coupling. Kosinski, Stilswell, and Graepel (2013) 
found that personality traits and attributes like sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, and political 
sympathies, are predictable from the rather commonly available information of Facebook 'likes'. 
Acquisti and Gross (2009) showed how simple, often publicly available information of an individual's 
place and date of birth can be exploited to predict his or her Social Security Number. Not less thought-
provoking are the findings of Acquisti, Gross, and Stutzman (2011): By combining facial recognition 
technologies and mining of publicly available online data they identified anonymous people from an 
offline photo and inferred potentially sensitive data about them from publicly available online sources, 
among these Facebook. Actually, by combining the methods from the two latter studies, the 
researchers were able to infer the Social Security Number of an anonymous person by a simple photo 
shot on the street. 
 
However, not only criminals are seeking the Internet users' personal information. Internet actors 
collect pieces of information about net users to vast data sets ('big data'). Market research and analysis 
firms specialize in coupling of isolated information elements to detailed profiles of users; profiles 
which are sold to commercial actors (The Norwegian Data Inspectorate, 2013). An example of such 
collection is how top-ranked Facebook applications was found transmitting user IDs to advertising and 
Internet tracking firms (Steel & Fowler, 2010). Recent technologies for capturing, coupling, analysis, 
and presentation of large data collections have increased the possibilities to utilize this information. 
Such activities are profitable, and by involving ample resources commercial actors' research in this 
area lie ahead of academic research (Jakobsen, 2013). And further, web scraping techniques allow 
unstructured web data (typically on html format) to be retrieved and transformed to structured data 
suited for analysis and storage in local databases. For example, Polakis et al (2010) describe 
techniques for the harvesting of email addresses coupled with other personal information from social 
networks. Extracting and combining data from websites can make the Internet users' personal 
information available in settings they were not originally intended for.  
 
The unauthorized utilization of personal information is an issue not only at the individual level. 
Blurring of borders between work and leisure make social engineering a security challenge at the 
organizational and the national level in the years to come, as well (NSM, 2010). Social media is one of 
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several channels used for social engineering aiming at getting access to sensitive information in 
information systems (NSM, 2010, 2011). BYOD
11
 policies and the use of work devices for leisure, 
combined with extensive use of social media and third-party applications, turn individuals' lack of risk 
awareness into a challenge for security at the organizational and the national levels, as well as for 
individuals.  
2.2 Privacy on Facebook 
2.2.1 An interesting case for privacy research 
Access to a person’s Facebook data commonly opens the door to a wealth of personal 
information
12
. Combined with the requirement of users' authenticity and the service's extensive 
popularity, this may be the largest collection of real identities in the world. Users' voluntary coupling 
of data from different contexts to complete profiles of themselves make personal information on 
Facebook highly valuable for other actors, whether these are commercial actors, cyber criminals, 
potential employers, or curious others.  
 
Facebook has been criticized for its privacy policy from users as well as from governments. The 
company has been subject to claims and law suits from privacy watchdogs in many countries, 
including in the U.S. and European countries like Germany, France, Ireland, and the Nordic. In a 
ranking by the organization Privacy International in 2007, the service was ranked as 1 of 7 bottom 
companies (Privacy International, 2007). Its design has been changed on several occasions in order to 
accommodate complaints, but privacy issues are still reported for this service on a daily basis. 
 
Many researchers have been studying Facebook and privacy, in the recent years particularly. 
Several studies show that users are concerned for their privacy on Facebook (Brandtzæg & Lüders, 
2009; Johnson, Egelman, & Bellovin, 2012), and in the years since Facebook was introduced, they 
have exhibited increasingly privacy-seeking behavior by reducing their amount of sharing outside their 
network of Facebook friends (Stutzman & Kramer-Duffield, 2010). However, they do share increasing 
amounts of personal information with people inside this network, and this sharing increase their 
sharing to 'silent listeners' at the same time (i.e. third-parties, Facebook itself, and advertisers, 
indirectly) (Stutzman & Kramer-Duffield, 2010).  
 
Users are often unaware of their sharing of information to silent listeners. Misunderstandings relate 
to the process of authorizing third-parties access to personal information, as well as to the content and 
                                                          
 
11 Bring Your Own Device: employees use personally owned devices to access  privileged systems or information at work 
12 like name, date of birth, contact information, education, preferences, network of friends, romantic relationships, sexual  
    preferences, political orientation, interests, cultural taste, and movements in the physical world 
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volume of the information actually accessed (Besmer & Lipford, 2010; King, Lampinen, & Smolen, 
2011; Wang, Xu, & Grossklags, 2011).  
 
Disclosures of personal information tend to increase extensively through the use of third-party 
applications. Information is shared not only through the user's own third-party activity, but through the 
activity of her Facebook friends, as well. Large amounts of personal information are transmitted from 
Facebook to external entities (Besmer & Lipford, 2010; Wang, et al., 2011) and 'there is a potential for 
a malicious application to quickly spread and harvest' user data through the use of third-party apps 
(Besmer & Lipford, 2010, p. 69). Third-parties do not always apply the standard authorization process 
recommended by Facebook, but rather redirects the user to websites outside Facebook (Wang, 2012). 
A further problem relates to the splitting of Facebook architecture in two separate privacy contexts 
(read more about Facebook architecture in the next subsection, 2.2.2), as third-parties can override 
users' global (Facebook Core, 2.2.2) privacy settings (Wang, et al., 2011). 
 
Facebook users are offered a rich set of mechanisms for information control; however, rich privacy 
settings do not necessarily provide a high level of protection. Users tend to find the privacy settings 
difficult to understand (Brandtzæg, Lûders, & Skjetne, 2010; Brandtzæg & Lüders, 2009; Stutzman & 
Kramer-Duffield, 2010), and high granularity in settings are found giving the paradoxical effect of 
increasing users' willingness to share sensitive information, even in cases where the objective risks of 
disclosure increased (Brandimarte, Acquisti, & Loewenstein, 2012). Studies of privacy settings often 
relate to settings in Facebook Core only. 
 
The privacy settings for Facebook Core are found as better suited for protection against the 
'outsider threat' (strangers, people outside our network of Facebook friends) than for the 'insider threat' 
(avoid sharing with selected subsets of friends in our network dependent on context) (Johnson, et al., 
2012). And finally,  Facebook users tend to underestimate the audience size for their posts, generally 
by a factor of three (Bernstein, Bakshy, Burke, & Karrer, 2013).   
 
In practice, Facebook posts shared for 'public' availability are accessible for the general Internet 
public. These posts are accessible through searches and navigation on the Facebook service; through 
search engines on the Internet; and also through web sites dedicated to search for information from 
social network services
13
.  
  
                                                          
 
13 examples are http://www.weknowwhatyouredoing.com/; usaface.net; http://ukface.net/;  www.spokeo.com 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Openbook (website); and http://www.pleaserobme.com 
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2.2.2 Architecture and information control 
This subsection reviews some aspects of the Facebook architecture central for this work. 
 
The Facebook service is made up of two main parts; the site's core functionality, Facebook Core, 
and a platform for integration of software from third parties, Facebook Platform. Facebook Core 
allows users to share personal information in a one-to-many fashion through a personal profile and a 
homepage called a Facebook wall
14
. Users also communicate through a chat/messaging service suited 
for one-to-one communication between single users. In Facebook Platform, users share information 
about themselves to other users as well as to third-party developers, through their own and also their 
friends' use of third-party applications. Personal information is shared in many forms (profile data, 
'likes', photos, status updates, and comments) and formats (text, photo, video, web links).  
 
By this splitting of the service's architecture, users face more than one privacy context in their 
interactions with Facebook. Separate mechanisms for information control yields for these two, main 
building blocks; privacy settings in Facebook Core regulates the information flow between Facebook 
users (friends and non-friends), and privacy settings in Facebook Platform regulates the flow between 
users and third parties (Wang, et al., 2011). Additionally, Facebook provides a set of mechanisms for 
regulation of information security, here denoted as Facebook Security. 
 
By integrating their applications with Facebook, third-party developers get access to the website’s 
millions of users. Anyone is allowed such access through a published and uniform interface, the Graph 
API. Facebook invites developers to use a standardized interface for collecting the users' 
authorizations for access to the personal information they want to include in their application design. 
This gives a standardized visual layout for situations where different third parties ask for access to 
different sets of personal information
15
. Figures 2-5 on the next page show examples of the user 
dialogue in Facebook Platform
16
. Facebook further encourage developers to utilize the users' own data 
to personalize the use experience of the application and by this integrate the application activity deeply 
with the users' interaction in Facebook Core: 'Facebook profile data can be used to personalize the user 
experience in your app so that it feels familiar, relevant and trusted by default' (Facebook, 2013b).  
 
Previous research has shown that users find information control mechanisms in both building 
blocks as difficult (subsection 2.2.1). The standardization and integration of the interface between 
them may create further problems by blurring the transition from one privacy context to the other.  
                                                          
 
14 Facebook Wall was changed and renamed at the time of data collection for this study. It is now called Facebook Timeline 
15 third-parties can ask for access to 63 different information/behavior permissions from users (Wang, 2012) and as of  March 
2012, more than 9 million third-party apps and websites were integrated with Facebook (http://newsroom.fb.com/Platform) 
16 Figures 5 and 6 illustrate a development in the authorization process turning visual focus from protection to entertainment 
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Figure 2: Facebook Platform: privacy settings for sharing through own use of third-party applications 
(sample application) 
Figure 3: Facebook Platform: privacy settings for sharing through friends's use of third-
party applications (default values) 
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Figure 5: Facebook Platform - authorizations page for third-party application (current design) 
Figure 4: Facebook Platform - authorizations page for third-party application 
(old design) 
14 
 
2.3 Privacy decisions and rationality 
In the light of the issues related to users' privacy situation on the Internet in general and on 
Facebook in particular, rational, fact-based knowledge of privacy are assumedly important for their 
ability to make competent privacy decisions.  
 
However, users' privacy decisions are not only rational (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005; Berendt, 
Günther, & Spiekermann, 2005; Iachello & Hong, 2007). Acquisti and Grossklags (2005) point to 
knowledge as crucial for privacy decision making, but also to the importance of individual factors like 
motivation, preferences, and past choices
17
. 
And further, Iachello and Hong states that 'privacy interacts with other social concerns, such as 
control, authority, appropriateness, and appearance' (2007, p. 4). Brandimarte, et al. (2012) found that 
a feeling of control increase users' willingness to share sensitive information, despite increasing risks. 
Besmer and Lipford (2010) showed that social interaction and expectations influence the users' 
granting of access to personal information to third-parties. And King, et al. (2011) found aspects of 
experience as consistent predictors for privacy concerns related to third-parties, where knowledge and 
behavior were not.  
Bawden (2008) discusses aspects of the concept digital literacy as introduced by Paul Gilster
18
, and 
states that 'digital literacy is not about… technology itself. It is about the ideas and mindsets, within 
which particular skills and competences operate…'  (2008, p. 19).  
 
These examples of previous research indicate that further explorations of privacy experiences may 
be important to understand users' behavior in privacy situations. Recent perspectives on user 
experiences within the area of HCI strengthen this impression by providing a more dynamic view of 
privacy including aspects like dialectics, temporal qualities, and the users' shaping of a social identity 
(Palen & Dourish, 2003). And also emphasizing a holistic view of users as humans feeling, sensing, 
and making sense of their interactions with technology (John McCarthy & Peter  Wright, 2004). 
 
By applying these perspectives, this study has been aimed at exploring a concept of privacy literacy 
which includes the emotions, ideas and mindsets that users bring into their encounters with 
technology, as well as their rational fact-based knowledge. 
  
                                                          
 
17 they further emphasize the importance of the users' cognitive resources and the problem of bounded rationality 
18 Paul Gilster: Digital Literacy (1997) 
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2.4 Research motivation 
Even if privacy has been an important research theme for some time, is a need for further research 
is recognized. In a review of previous research on security decisions for home computer users, Howe, 
Ray, Roberts, Urbanska, and Byrne (2012) point out how considerable effort has been directed at 
investigating the usability of security tools, yet less at elucidating how users understand privacy and 
security threats and their potential consequences. They recommend the use of a qualitative 
methodology to provide rich explanations and descriptions of users' perceptions and choices. They 
further recommend assessing the impact of demographics on privacy behavior, age in particular. In 
their review of privacy research in HCI, Iachello and Hong (2007) point to the need to gain a deeper 
understanding of the factors influencing users' privacy behavior, and to investigate the social and 
dialectic aspects of privacy, in particular.  
 
Previous research has presented findings relevant for some of the areas of privacy literacy 
investigated in this work (this chapter). To the best of my knowledge, no works based on empirical 
data have been aimed at gathering findings from different areas of user knowledge into a common 
model of privacy literacy. This work is thought of as an initial exploration of such a model. The 
purpose is to clarify aspects of literacy crucial for users' behavior in the privacy area. Insights in user 
behavior can increase our ability to develop software accounting for the users' actual needs. 
 
A deeper understanding of users' privacy behavior would be beneficial for the Norwegian public 
debate about privacy and information security. By aiming at understanding users' choices by exploring 
the relations between privacy decisions, knowledge, user experiences, and age, this study hopefully 
contribute in this direction.  As described earlier in this chapter, the question of users' privacy choices 
affects security not only at the individual level, yet at the organizational and even at the national level, 
as well. Improving our understanding of privacy behavior can be useful for regulation and education 
within the privacy and information security area. These insights can be passed on in order to support 
users' awareness to and understanding of their own online privacy, as well. 
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3. THEORY 
This chapter presents the theoretical perspective chosen for this study. The perspective is based on 
two recent contributions to HCI research which are turning to the emotional, interactional, and 
dialectical to understand users' privacy interactions with technology: Privacy for a Networked World 
(Palen & Dourish, 2003) and Technology as Experience (John McCarthy & Peter  Wright, 2004).  
 
Section 3.1 presents a review of privacy research in HCI. Section 3.2 looks into the foundation of 
the tradition of personal privacy research and positions the Privacy for a Networked World framework 
within this tradition. Section 3.3 reviews the development of the concept of the user experience and 
relates the second contribution, the Technology as Experience framework, to this setting. Section 3.4 
summarizes the theoretical perspective for this study. 
3.1 Privacy research in Human-Computer Interaction 
Iachello and Hong (2007) have surveyed research on the topic of privacy in the HCI area in the past 
decades. They describe a general, mutual influence between technology developments and the 
theorizing about technology. Technological innovations, our use of these, as well as the social 
expectations incumbent on the technologies, all tend towards shifts in focus for technology research. 
Three main technological and theoretical shifts within HCI the last 3-4 decades have introduced 
changes in research on and conceptualizations of privacy: 
 
1960-80: The non-discretionary era: focus on centralized personal data management 
1980-2000: The self-determination period: focus on users' discretionary use of technology 
2000-today: Implicit interaction: focus on interpersonal communication and behavioral analysis 
 
Within the research community, these shifts are more generally referred to as the three waves of 
HCI. The earliest phase, the first wave, was characterized by command-based and simple 
WIMP/GUI
19
 interfaces (Sharp, Rogers, & Preece, 2007). Computers, programs, and centralized 
computing were highly focused. A view of the user as an information-processing unit analogous to the 
computer dominated the research area until the 1980's. The transition to the next phase was identified 
and described by Bannon (1991) as a shift 'From Human Factors to Human Actors'. Bannon strongly 
criticized the view of users as depersonalized, passive, and naïve. He described the way people was 
treated during the first phase as '…at worst, idiots who must be shielded from the machine, or at best, 
as simply sets of elementary processes or "factors" that can be studied in isolation in the laboratory' 
(1991, p. 1).  
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In the second wave, a view of users as human agents achieving their meaningful goals in a real-life 
contexts came into focus. The users' values, motivation, and practices, as well as the contexts these 
practices were situated in, became important. Seen as the experts of the area of application, users were 
more commonly included as participants in the design of technologies. Typical interfaces in this period 
were advanced GUI's, web interfaces, as well as speech-, gesture- and touch-based interfaces (Sharp, 
et al., 2007). Technology use at the workplace, communities of practice, and the social interaction 
taking place between users were important aspects in this picture. 
 
Bødker (2006) describes characteristics of a new shift in focus at the end of the 1990's, which may 
be referred to as a third wave of HCI 
20
: During the last 10-15 years, a range of new technologies have 
appeared; pervasive  and mobile technologies; technologies based on implicit interaction
21
; augmented 
reality, and the use of wearable and tangible interfaces. The use contexts and application types are 
broadened and intermixed. Technology has spread into most areas of our everyday lives and culture, 
flowing across contexts, and blurring the traditional borders between workplace and leisure, rationality 
and emotion, as well as between the public and private spheres. These technological developments 
also bring new elements of human life into HCI theorizing; elements like culture, interaction and 
dialogue in a social, cultural, and historic context. A stronger focus on the users' experiences of their 
interactions with technology includes new human skills and abilities, as well as an expansion of the 
cognitive to the emotional, in research. 
 
The theoretical and technological shifts came to influence research on privacy, as well (Iachello & 
Hong, 2007). In the first phase of centralized data management, the non-discretionary era, privacy research 
was characterized by the top-down approach that was typical for IT in the 60's and 70's. Focus was 
kept on data protection mechanisms in central computing systems, data owners in charge of the 
management of personal data, and the specification of unambiguous rules for handling of data use 
limitations. In the 80's, the self-determination period, advances in personal computing turned focus to 
the discretionary user, to trust, and to the users' right to decide upon the use of their personal data 
(informational self-determination). In the third phase, the period of implicit interaction, emergence of 
the Internet has enabled new forms of communication and an increasing fluidity of personal 
information, and given rise to a new focus on interpersonal privacy in everyday interactions and 
communication. New interactions in non-traditional settings, as well as the character and amounts of 
                                                          
 
20 Bødker questions the assumption of a' true' third wave of HCI, but denote these new elements of HCI by the concept of a  
    third wave 
21
 automated interaction based on situational context rather than on the user's direct manipulation by GUI's 
19 
 
personal data collected, heighten the risks for misuse and introduce new challenges to research on 
privacy. 
 
The question of privacy spans the social, the technical, as well as in the regulatory, and these issues 
have been researched from various perspectives across disciplines. A common definition of this 
concept has not been agreed upon. Privacy research in HCI is also closely intertwined with security 
research, with research within the area of Usable Security in particular. Presenting an inclusive 
overview of previous research in the privacy field would be out of scope of this work, however an 
overview of trends and works in privacy research in HCI and CSCW
22
 are presented by Iachello and 
Hong (2007); an overview of research on 'Usability and Security for Home Computer Users' in Howe, 
et al. (2012); and a presentation of theories and views on the concept of privacy are found in Solove 
(2008, ch. 1-2), for example.  
 
Irwin Altman
23
 and Alan Westin
24
 both developed theories of privacy which have stimulated 
research on this topic from the 1970's. Their research originates from different disciplines, from social 
psychology and law, respectively. In Altman's theory, a process perspective on privacy in its social 
environment is emphasized, whereas Westin's work focuses on information privacy and the 
classification of privacy in states and functions (Margulis, 2003). These classical works became 
sources for two main directions of privacy research within HCI; Data Protection and Personal Privacy 
research. Data Protection research draws on Westin's theory, and focuses on privacy in the 
relationship between individuals and large organizations like governments or commercial entities. 
Typically, research questions center on the problem of regulating for what purposes and at what time 
individuals' personal data are used by these organizations. In contrast, Personal Privacy research is 
focused on interpersonal relationships and questions of how people manage their privacy in relation to 
other individuals. Personal privacy research has its origin in Altman's works on privacy in the 
physical world, and his theory was later adapted by Palen and Dourish into an analytical framework 
for privacy in IT settings; 'Unpacking Privacy For a Networked World' (2003). The next section 
presents a further look is into these theoretical contributions. 
3.2 A social-systems orientation towards privacy 
In his work on privacy in the physical world, Irwin Altman (1975, ch. 1-3) take an ecological, 
social-systems orientation towards the concept of privacy, where the social, physical, cultural, and 
temporal contexts of the privacy process are important aspect for understanding the concept. Defined 
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as 'the selective control of access to the self or to one's group' (1975, p. 18), privacy is an 
interpersonal, dynamic, dialectic, and goal-oriented boundary regulation process, where a person or a 
group control (restrict or seek) their interaction with others by means of four behavioral control 
mechanisms.  
These boundary regulation mechanisms are: personal space (changing communications with others 
by alterations of the area immediately around the body); territorial behaviors (regulating by 
possession, marking and defense of physical objects and areas); verbal and nonverbal behavior (what 
people say, by words or body language, to others to make themselves more and less accessible, and 
how they do that); as well as cultural mechanisms (regulating by customs, norms, and styles of 
behavior in a cultural group). The process is goal-oriented in striving to reach the momentary, desired 
level of privacy, which is an internal, personal state based on 'past experiences, immediate 
possibilities, and general personal style' (1975, p. 8). When the regulation process fail to reach the 
optimum level of privacy, the level of interaction achieved give more (crowding) or less (social 
isolation) interaction than the desired, transient goal of the regulation process prescribes.  
 
The regulation of interaction on a continuum from closeness to self to closeness to social 
environment is one major function of the privacy process. This interpersonal function of privacy is an 
important end by itself, yet additionally supports the two other main functions of privacy; the function 
of self-definition and the function of self-identity
25
. Self-definition relates to the definition of one's self 
by social comparison; comparing self to others in order to clarify and define own feelings and 
perceptions. Self-identity is defined as:  
'… a person or group's cognitive, psychological, and emotional definitions and understanding of 
themselves as beings… one's capabilities and limitations, strengths and weaknesses, emotions and 
cognitions, beliefs and disbeliefs'  (1975, p. 49) 
Altman's theory from the 1970's describes privacy and privacy regulating mechanisms for 
interactions in the physical world. The technological innovations from the last decades has changed 
and complicated the privacy process. Through the introduction of pervasive technologies, information 
processing are integrated into everyday objects and activities, and new representations of personal 
information have appeared; digital photos, text, audio recordings, location data, biometrical data, etc. 
Grudin (2001) describe how information may change when it is converted to digital format; transient 
information becomes permanent (persistence); local information becomes globally available; digital 
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information tend to spread rapidly (virality), and may be left desituated.
26
 Digital information can have 
new audiences in another place and time than initially intended for and new interpretations of the 
information emerge. Further, as human states (physical, social and emotional) can be difficult to 
capture and represent digitally, and as software-based interpretations of information may differ from 
interpretations made by human processes (biological, psychological and social), this might change the 
characteristics of the information in the processes of converting it to and managing it in digital form. 
 
These transformations of information imposed by IT complicate the privacy regulation process, and 
potentially aggravate the negative consequences of insufficient privacy regulation. By this, they set the 
question of privacy in a new light. Palen and Dourish (2003) further focus how technology mediates 
action in a different way than the physical, everyday environment. Interaction in the virtual world 
eliminates the regulating mechanisms tied to the physical presence of interacting parties, and 
mechanisms like closing the door, leaving the range of vision/hearing, and closing the blinds, are no 
longer valid options. Consequently, when entering the virtual world, new mechanisms for regulation 
of the privacy process are needed. 
3.2.1 Privacy For a Networked World 
Palen and Dourish (2003) adapted Altman's theory into an analytical model for approaching 
privacy for networked settings. Like Altman, they frame privacy as a boundary regulation process 
where people bargain their privacy continuously by managing goals in tension. By regulating the flow 
of personal information, people aim at achieving their momentary goals. Information disclosure is not 
a mere threat, but a desirable tool that help us in social purposes like managing others’ conceptions of 
our selves, and shaping our identity, as well. The dynamic process of privacy regulation takes place in 
a cultural, historical, and social context. The process is dialectic; in the sense that regulation is 
governed by the tension between the user's own expectations and the expectations of others 
participants in the interaction. Users continuously bargain and optimize their accessibility along a 
spectrum of openness and closedness to achieve the desired privacy state.  
 
New technologies introduce a need for new behavioral mechanisms for regulation of the privacy 
process. Palen and Dourish's model extends Altman's thoughts with the concepts of privacy 
boundaries and disclosure genres.  
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Users regulate their open- and closedness to others along three different dimensions; the boundaries 
of disclosure, time, and identity. Privacy boundaries represent points of balance (and resolution of 
conflict) between competing goals. Boundaries change dynamically as the context changes. The 
boundaries are described by the tension of goals that they are representing. Three boundaries are 
central to privacy regulation: Disclosure boundary, where privacy and publicity are in tension. In 
trying to maintain both a private and a public façade, we regulate privacy by avoiding information 
disclosure and by selectively disclosing information; Identity boundary is the boundary between self 
and other, and includes the identity of both parties involved in the information exchange; and the 
Temporality boundary is the time-associated boundary that reflects how current privacy management 
is oriented towards events in the past and future. The tensions of the three privacy boundaries are not 
resolved independently; they interrelate and influence each other mutually as parts of the same 
continuous privacy process.  
 
IT has the ability to disrupt and destabilize regulation of the boundaries by a repertoire of potential 
roles in the privacy process: as causing change, disruption, or establishment of boundaries; as 
spanning boundaries; as a mean to manage boundaries; or as process context. The concept of 
boundaries can help us understand the different roles technology can play in the privacy process.  
Technology itself 'does not directly support or interfere with personal privacy; rather it destabilizes the 
delicate and complex web of regulatory practices' (2003, p. 133). Table 2 summarizes central aspects of 
the concept of privacy boundaries. 
 
Boundary Goals in tension Purpose of regulation Samples of disruption 
Disclosure 
boundary 
privacy vs. publicity controlling the degree of 
information disclosure 
 information disclosure by 
others  (e.g. friends/ third party) 
 information persistence 
Identity 
boundary 
self vs. others controlling the display of 
identity and others’ 
interpretations of our self 
 desituating information        
(e.g. time, place or intention 
lost in mediation) 
 information persistence 
Temporality 
boundary 
past, present and future 
interpretations of and 
actions upon disclosed 
information  
controlling the current privacy 
process in light of experiences 
of and expectations to 
interpretations of disclosed 
information 
 
 the rapid distribution of 
information 
 information persistence 
 
Palen and Dourish also introduce the concept of disclosure genres, which are patterns of privacy 
management that represents a given point of balance between the three privacy boundaries. 'At any 
given moment, the balance between self and other, privacy and publicity, and past and future must 
have a single coherent and coordinated resolution'  (2003, p. 133). Genres are socially constructed, and 
Table 2: Privacy boundaries in the 'Privacy for a Networked World' framework 
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reflect that there is a relationship between how we disclose information and our expectations of the use 
of it. These patterns of privacy management set expectations around a given technology arrangement, 
and contribute to its integration into recurring social practices.  
 
This analytical framework present a more nuanced understanding of privacy issues than some 
traditional concepts of privacy
27
. The perspective covers the users' need to protect and shield personal 
information on the one hand and their deliberate use of information technology for social purposes, on 
the other. By viewing privacy as a social, dynamic and dialectic process in its real-world contexts, this 
perspective turns focus to users coming to encounters with technology bringing their whole life. These 
concepts can assist analysis of privacy in identifying the social arrangements implicit in a given 
technology design, and in determining if these implicit arrangements match the actual expectations 
that users bring into their interactions with technology.  
3.3 Understanding user experiences 
Historically, there has been a high attention in HCI research on the instrumental and technical 
aspects of technology; on individual problem solving, user goals, task flows, utility, as well as on 
traditional usability concepts
28
. Technological developments have increased the focus on the non-
instrumental qualities of the technology. The use contexts and application types brought in by leisure 
use of technology, has strengthened the expectations to the esthetics, ethics, and emotions of the users' 
interactions. And research in this area has contributed to an increasing understanding of the 
correlations between usability and user experience, and of  how non-instrumental aspects tend to 
impact measurable, instrumental outcomes (Löwgren, 2013; Sharp, et al., 2007).  
 
However, exploring the concept of user experience is not new in HCI. From the early 80's 
researchers have been trying to approach this concept (Blythe, Overbeeke, Monk, & Wright, 2005, 
Introduction). One reason for the rather slow adoption of this as a research topic are the lack of clear 
concepts and models, and the problems of measuring user experiences, as opposed to usability. In the 
last decade, several researchers have been aiming at clarifying this concept.  
 
Norman (2004) recognize both cognition and emotions as important for users' assignment of 
meaning and value to an interaction.  His three-layered, hierarchical model for emotional design 
reflects a close relation between these two. The model, based on the last decades of research in 
cognitive science, describe three layers referring to different levels of brain activity. The lowest, 
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visceral level is the affective level. The visceral level communicates with the middle, behavioral level, 
and both levels receive signals from the sensory system of the body. Based on this input, these two 
layers control the body's motor system. The upper, reflective level, intellectualize the activity 
registered and processed in the two lower levels. Together, the three levels of brain activity controls 
human behavior and emotions, and good designs should aim at an integration of the three.  
 
Hassenzahl, Diefenbach, and Göritz (2010) have contributed in the exploration of the concept of 
the user experience, by construing an explanatory model of experience. Hassenzahl (2013) describe 
experience as subjective, holistic, situated, dynamic, and worthwhile. He separates experience
29
 
(meaningful, personally encountered events) from the knowledge coming out of the experience
30
. He 
further separates the immediate, moment-by-moment experience from our memorized stories from 
experiences.  A similar distinction as the latter is made by Forlizzi and Battarbee (2004, p. 263). In 
their interaction-oriented approach they separate an experience (an experience with a known 
beginning and end, which may inspire behavioral and emotional change) from experience (the 
constant, conscious stream of self-talk in product interactions). In their user experience concept, 
Forlizzi & Battarbee include the user's overall conceptions of quality of the product interaction, as well 
as the emotions and reactions evoked in the user during an interaction. 
 
The sensual and emotional aspects of the users’ interaction can be difficult to understand, to get 
access to, and to represent in a manner suitable for systematic analysis. McCarthy & Wright introduce 
an integrated framework to support this process: The 'Technology as Experience' framework (John 
McCarthy & Peter Wright, 2004; John McCarthy & Peter  Wright, 2004; Wright, McCarthy, & 
Meekison, 2005). In this framework, four characterizing aspects (threads) and six central (meaning-
making) processes of the user experience are explored. In Wright, et al. (2005), experience is separated 
from the knowledge that come out of it, by referring to the confusion of the user experience concept 
with concepts like subjective feelings, behavior, activity, social practice, and knowledge. The user 
experience has commonly been treated as an individual construct in the HCI research literature. An 
individual-centered view may leave out qualities like ethical implications and communication, which 
are typically social or communal by nature (Löwgren, 2013).  McCarthy and Wright's pragmatist view 
is rooted in second generation HCI, and by focusing on the felt experience in a social and cultural 
context, they bridge the individual to the collective (Bødker, 2006). In the following subsection, their 
framework is presented in more detail.  
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30 in Norwegian: erfaring, in German: erfahrung 
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3.3.1 Technology as Experience 
The “Technology as experience” framework is developed to see relationships between people and 
technology in 'all their potential value, meaning, and vitality' (John McCarthy & Peter  Wright, 2004, 
p. 79). 
 
People interact with technology in more and more areas of their lives, and a range of different 
technologies are deeply embedded into many peoples everyday lives. We not only use technology, we 
live with it. Our interaction with technology is imbued with values, needs, desires, and goals, and 
technology use become a 'felt' experience to the user. To understand users' behavior, their preferences 
and choices, it is vital to focus not only the rational, logical, and utilitarian considerations of 
technology use, rather we should look towards the sensual, emotional, and intellectual aspects of the 
interaction together, to understand the users' experiences in a holistic perspective. And further, in the 
interaction with technology, our subjective values, needs, desires, and goals contribute to the meaning 
we make of the experience, as do the cultural context in which the experience takes place.  
 
This holistic view on the user and the interaction reveal the image of an experience as more than 
the mere activities taking place within the start and the end of an interaction. A basic foundation for 
this framework is the recognition of users' experience as extending the current use situation: 
…we also recognize that the feeling-life does not begin and end with the immediate quality of an 
experience, rather it extends across space and time to the sense we make of experience in terms of 
our selves, our culture, and our lives (2004, p. 42) 
To support the analysis of experiences from this holistic perspective, McCarthy and Wright present 
ten framework components interwoven to an integrated whole: the four threads of experience, and the 
six sense-making processes. 
The four threads of experience are the compositional 
thread (seeing the elements of an experience as a 
coherent whole), the sensual thread (looking for feelings 
associated to the design and the overall atmosphere), the 
emotional thread (analyzing the emotions that color the 
experience), and the spatio-temporal thread (observing 
effects of time and place). The authors characterize these 
four threads not as fundamental elements of an 
experience, rather as ideas that contribute to sensitize 
analysis to the various aspects of the experience.  
 
Weaving the four threads together, the six sense-making 
processes remind us of further aspects to look for when analyzing experiences; anticipating (bringing 
prejudices into the experience), connecting (immediate sensing the situation), interpreting (working 
Figure 6: Technology as Experience – an integrated 
framework 
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out what is going on and how we feel about it), reflecting (examining and evaluating the interaction), 
appropriating (aligning the new experience with earlier experiences and with our sense of self), as 
well as recounting (telling stories about the experience). These processes are not mutually exclusive; 
they do overlap, and no clear boundaries between should be expected to be found. 
 
The four threads provide different perspectives for viewing the user experience in analysis and the 
users' meaning-making is emphasized in the six processes. Yet, instead of isolating separate elements 
of experience, McCarthy & Wright focus on bringing out the interaction and interdependencies 
between the framework elements: '[A reductive approach] is not our intention. Rather we intend to 
connote a space within which things can be juxtaposed, related, separated, coalesced, but never 
isolated' (Wright, et al., 2005, p. 46). 
 
The ten framework components help us focusing studies of the people-technology relationship on 
the emotional quality of the interaction. By providing pragmatic tools for thinking, the framework 
supports the researcher in considering the emotional, intellectual, and sensual aspects of experiences 
with technology. Figure 6 illustrates the framework of interwoven components, as I see it.  
3.4 Theoretical perspective for this study 
The main focus of this study is how users' privacy literacy31affects their privacy decisions. Based 
on an instrumental view of users, fact-based knowledge of privacy has been subject to investigation. 
But privacy decisions are not always rational (section 2.3); this inspires a look for further factors with 
the potential of influencing users' decisions.  
 
Mathiasen and Bødker (2008) found that users' experiences of security in interactions differed from 
their actual security situation; being secure was not the same as having a secure experience. To the 
extent that privacy decisions are influenced by a privacy experience diverging from users' actual 
privacy situation, decisions may be inadequate to protect privacy. In this light, the role of experience 
aspects like emotions, reflections, attitudes, and former experiences are subject to investigation in this 
study, as well.  
Experiences are not knowledge (section 3.3), but knowledge may come out of user experiences and 
supplement users' fact-based knowledge of privacy. The Technology as Experience framework provide 
ways to get access to experiences and  help preserving a holistic view of users and the way they make 
meaning of their interactions. This perspective was chosen as part of the theoretical foundation for this 
work. 
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To complement this experience-oriented perspective, the Privacy for a Networked World 
framework from personal privacy research has been chosen. This framework '…takes a step back and 
asks how users come to manage and know about privacy' (Lampinen, Stutzman, & Bylund, 2011, p. 
2442). Personal privacy research focus how people manage their privacy with respect to other 
individuals, and provides models suitable for explaining privacy decisions which are highly situational 
and depending upon the social and historical context of the people involved (Iachello & Hong, 2007). 
This situation is common for many interactions in social media; information of various kinds is shared, 
often spontaneously, to audiences from a mix of social contexts. The Privacy for a Networked World 
framework is directed at capturing the dialectic, social, and temporal aspects of privacy interactions in 
particular; aspects that this study has been aimed at investigating. 
 
The two perspectives are turning to the social and interactional to understand users' technology use, 
and can increase sensibility to the dynamic and dialectic aspects of users' encounters with technology. 
And also the focus on identity found in both perspectives may be important for an analysis of users' 
privacy decisions.  
 
This study focuses the consequences of privacy breaches for integrity (Figure 1), and typical 
security issues are included to the extent that they are targeted at privacy (section 2.1). As security 
mechanisms are the basic tools for privacy protection, privacy and information security are closely 
related. This is the reason why much of the HCI privacy literature is intertwined with that of usable 
security (Iachello & Hong, 2007). And further, a common understanding of the term for privacy used 
in the interviews, personvern
32
, includes issues traditionally thought of as information security issues. 
Assumedly, from the informants' point of view, the concepts of privacy and security overlap; it all 
comes down to a question of protecting data against coming into the hands of unauthorized others. 
 
This work is assumed to fit into the HCI research traditions personal privacy research and usable 
security. 
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4. METHOD 
A research method can be understood as a strategy of inquiry upon which the research design is 
based. This strategy includes a selection of techniques for handling of empirical data, as well as a set 
of research practices and an underlying philosophical stance (Bryman, 2008). This chapter reviews the 
methodological choices for this study. As a start, section 4.1 details the problem area and the research 
questions. Section 4.2 describe the qualitative and interpretive approach chosen for the study, and 
section 4.3 elaborate how two pilot studies ahead of the main study was used to test and develop the 
research design methodologically as well as thematically, in an iterative and data-driven process. 
Finally, section 4.4 describes the data collection process based on qualitative interviews and a 
purposive sample where participants
33
 were chosen based on the criteria age and level of Facebook 
activity. This section further details how analysis of data was carried out in two main phases; a 
qualitative phase succeeded by a phase characterized by the use of more quantitative analysis 
techniques.  
Research projects collecting personal data are obliged to apply for approval of research design 
ahead of data collection (NESH, 2006). This study has been approved by the Norwegian Privacy 
Ombudsman for Research (NSD, 2011). In the research process, protection of the participants’ 
integrity and rights to co-determination has been emphasized, by acquiring informed consents ahead of 
data collection, as well as by aiming at conducting interviews and transcribing, analyzing, and 
presenting the empirical material in a respectful way. Interview data has been anonymized and stored 
in compliance with NESH guidelines. 
4.1 Basic assumptions 
This study focus on cases where social media users disclose 
personal information in ways that expose this information to 
risks. I see two problematic situations potentially causing non-
secure behavior. Figure 7 and Figure 8 draw a picture of the 
problem area, and illustrate a situation where two users (A, B) 
are both exposed to a threat (X) in their interactions.  
 
The first problem relates to the privacy decision that is likely to 
follow a user's recognition of an actual threat. User A is aware of 
threat X, and this threat is included in user A's realistic view of 
threats (Figure 7). When user A recognizes the threat, she is 
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Figure 7: Different views of threats in the 
interaction 
30 
 
facing a privacy decision (Figure 8). She can choose to take protective actions to prevent the negative 
consequences of the threat (giving up sharing the information; adjusting her privacy settings before 
sharing; or choosing other protective action available), or alternatively, she can choose to ignore the 
threat and go on disclosing the information without any protective actions. Users ignoring a 
recognized threat deliberately expose themselves 
to risks. To prevent blunders, violations, or 
dangers associated with non-secure behavior, we 
need to learn more about these decisions. In this 
study, I raise the question if inadequate 
KNOWLEDGE of privacy can explain why some 
users in this way deliberately expose their 
personal information to risks?  
 
The second problem relates to the situation where 
a user is unaware of her information being 
exposed to threats. As threat X is outside of user B's limited view of threats (Figure 7), she is not likely 
to reach a privacy decision (Figure 8), and remains unaware of her personal information being exposed 
to the risks represented by threat X. Again, I raise the question if inadequate KNOWLEDGE can explain 
why some users in this way unwittingly expose their personal information to risks?  
 
Additionally, I raise questions about the role of the users' EXPERIENCES for their privacy literacy. 
For example, can an experience of feeling secure influence the user to make a non-rational decision; 
choosing to disclose information even when her fact-
based knowledge calls for the opposite? Or, can 
elements of the user experience explain why a user is 
unaware of a given threat in her interaction? And 
further, the users' previous experiences, do these bring 
in knowledge that is important for the two situations? 
Based on the theoretical perspective drawn up in the 
previous chapter, Figure 9 illustrates a basic 
assumption for the following exploration of users' 
privacy literacy; EXPERIENCE and KNOWLEDGE blend 
in decision-making. The users' privacy decisions are 
framed by the experience they have when interacting.  
Elements from this user experience potentially 
influence how they perceive and manage privacy related situations. And, previous user experiences 
can influence the current, by bringing in new knowledge to the users' privacy literacy.  
Figure 8: Problem overview: two sources of non-secure behavior 
Figure 9: A basic assumption for privacy decisions 
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This assumption reflects an understanding of knowledge and experience as complementary in users' 
privacy literacy; an understanding of emotional elements from the user experience as supplementing 
the user's rational, fact-based knowledge. Working with the empirical material, I have focused on 1) 
mapping out the participants' knowledge based on a selection of privacy knowledge elements; 2) 
exploring a possible relation of this knowledge to the participants' choices in actual privacy situations 
on Facebook; and 3) exploring the participants' user experiences to uncover elements of these 
potentially influencing their privacy situations further. 
4.2 A qualitative and interpretive approach 
This work has been based on a qualitative and interpretive approach. One of the most recognized 
advantages of using a qualitative research approach is its potential to open up for unexpected 
knowledge. The research process is flexible, and research design is commonly revised throughout the 
project as new knowledge is required, and the approach is useful in research in areas needing to 
develop new hypotheses and insights (Bryman, 2008). A qualitative approach is particularly suitable in 
studies focusing on capturing people’s experiences, values, attitudes, and interactions in a socio-
cultural context, and to explore the social meanings they assign to phenomena in their lives (Malterud, 
2002). An interpretive perspective is commonly associated with the conception of reality as a social 
construct. Rather than owning an objective existence in reality, a social phenomenon is seen as 
produced and continually revised through social interaction and the meanings that people assign to it 
through their interaction (Walsham, 1995). A qualitative and interpretive approach is well suited for 
this study's research questions, related to participants' meaning-making in their privacy experiences, 
'imbued with values, needs, desires, and goals' (John McCarthy & Peter  Wright, 2004) within a social 
and cultural context. 
4.2.1 An iterative, data-driven process 
A qualitative research style usually implies a research process based on inductive reasoning, 
building theory from empirical data (Bryman, 2008). A practice of iterated collections and analyses of 
empirical data, adjusting interview guide and sampling strategy when needed, can contribute to 
strengthen the study’s overall validity (Malterud, 2002). An inductive, data-driven and iterative 
approach has been employed in this study. With two pilot studies
34
 preceding the main study, three 
main iterations has been run through. Additionally, smaller iterations has been done within the frames  
of the main study. Qualitative interviews have been used as the primary method for data gathering. 
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As illustrated in Figure 10 (depicting Bryman, 2008, 
figure 16.1), such iterative approach to data 
collection and data analysis is commonly 
employed in qualitative research. The figure 
reflects the iterative refinement of the thematic 
aspects of a study, focusing on tighter 
specification of the research questions in the 
iterations, followed by collection and 
interpretation of further data.  
 
In this study, research design has developed 
iteratively along the methodological as well as the 
thematic dimension. Methodologically, research 
design developed iteratively by a reconsideration 
of the chosen data collection method after pilot 
studies, as well as by an iterative development of 
the data gathering techniques employed in the 
interview guide. The thematic aspects developed iteratively by a gradual refinement of research 
questions and the interview guide. The remainder of this chapter details these developments further. 
4.2.2 Data collection method 
If you would like to know how people understand the world and their lives, why not ask them? 
This question
35
 opens Kvale's book about the qualitative research interview. Conversation is a basic 
form of human interaction, an interaction providing possibilities to learn about other people, as well as 
a way to get access to their experiences, emotions, attitudes, and the world they live in (Kvale, 2001). 
In HCI, both quantitative and qualitative techniques have been used to gather users' preferences and 
attitudes to privacy. The qualitative approaches are most used in probings of personal privacy 
dynamics, and the personal interview is a commonly employed method (Iachello & Hong, 2007). 
 
The method selected for data collection should be the most relevant for, by this revealing the best 
validity for, the research questions (Bryman, 2008; Malterud, 2002). Based on an expectation that the 
conversational form of personal interviews would give access to the knowledge, experiences, 
emotions, and attitudes focused by the research questions, qualitative interviews were chosen as the 
primary data collection method for this study.  
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Figure 10: An outline of the main steps in qualitative research 
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At an early stage, the use of focus groups was considered. However, due to the risk of  poor data 
from this method for a rather sensitive research topic like privacy (Iachello & Hong, 2007), the 
method was rejected.  Another approach considered at that time is contextual interviews. Privacy can 
be hard to rationalize (chapter 2); what people say they want not uncommonly differs from what they 
actually do in practice. In contextual interviews, the researcher watches the participants' actual use of 
the technology. Choosing this method could solve the need for sufficient context for questions about 
privacy (Iachello & Hong, 2007), and would include a potentially profitable element of observation in 
the interviewing process. However, asking participants for access to their day-to day use of their 
personal Facebook account would require them to share quite personal information with the 
researcher. By this reason, contextual interviews were not chosen as the primary data collection 
method. Finally, a triangulation
36
 of methods, by combining qualitative interviews with a diary study, 
was decided upon and tested out in a first pilot study, unfortunately without any success. Experiences 
from the two pilot studies are further detailed in the next section.  
 
To account for the above mentioned need to include sufficient context for the interview questions, 
specific cases in the form of use scenarios were included in the interview guide. Participants were 
invited to discuss these concrete, but impersonal cases in the qualitative interviews. Use scenarios 
were employed in a way that has a lot in common with the vignette technique used in surveys. Finch 
(1987) accentuates several advantages associated with the use of vignettes to get access to attitudes in 
a sensitive area; they clarify  questions by anchoring them in specific situations, they permit a certain 
amount of distance between the question and the participant, and result in a less threatening context. 
And further, to get access to elements of the participants' actual behavior on Facebook, the interviews 
were focused on their static behavioral choices in the form of privacy settings. A walkthrough of a 
selection of their privacy settings is assumedly found less sensitive for participants than disclosing the 
personal information they dynamically share with their friends in their daily use of the Facebook 
service.  
4.3 Pilot studies 
The study was originally designed to make use of in-depth interviews preceded by a diary study, 
where the participants' own selection of authentic examples of privacy-sensitive situations from daily 
Facebook use was to be included. This combination of methods, by Bryman (2008) described as diary 
interviews, were successfully employed by Mathiasen and Bødker (2008) in their study of secure 
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experiences. The data cross-checks involved in triangulation of collection methods can provide 
additional validity to the empirical data material.  
 
For a three weeks period, the diary interview design was tested out in a first pilot study. 
Participants were asked to report examples of situations they perceived as potentially sensitive to their 
own privacy, or to the privacy of others. Data could be reported quite flexibly: as text and images in 
the form of notes, text messages, emails, photos, or screen shots. The goal was to grasp concrete 
situations that could be used to elicit the participant's thoughts and attitudes in subsequent personal 
interviews. Written instructions were provided to the participants, describing the intentions and the 
procedure for the pilot. However, participants reported that no privacy-sensitive situations were 
observed during the period, and this pilot of diary interviews ended up giving no empirical data.  
 
Based on this experience, the choice of data collection method was reconsidered. The diary study 
part was abandoned. Personal interviews was chosen as the primary data collection method for the 
study, based on an expectation that face-to-face contact with the informants could reveal the empirical 
material needed to answer the research questions. To find out if this expectation was valid, I decided to 
do a second pilot study to get thorough experience with qualitative interviews. A preliminary version 
of the interview guide was developed based on the research questions at that time, and four 
participants volunteered as test interviewees in this second pilot; two adults and two teens. Each pilot 
interview lasted for 1 hour +/-, and the interviews were audio recorded. The second pilot study 
provided an opportunity to test out different techniques for getting access to the informants' attitudes, 
experiences, and reflections, as well as a way of iteratively developing the interview guide and the 
research questions. This iterative development of the research design is described in subsections 4.5.1 
(thematic developments) and 4.5.2 (methodological developments), respectively. 
4.3.1 Developing the research theme 
The thematic aspects of the study developed gradually throughout the research process. Pilot 
studies, in particular, influenced the formulation of research questions and interview guide.  
 
The earliest version of the interview guide was based on research questions not yet narrowed down 
to issues related to privacy literacy. At this stage, the research questions were raising general questions 
to which factors that influence our privacy experiences and privacy decisions on Facebook. In the 
pilots, the impression of the knowledge factor's potential importance was strengthened. Some 
interview questions did not work out very well, possibly due to an implicit expectation to the 
participants' level of knowledge. Knowledge aspects like the third parties' access to personal data; the 
potential cooperation between commercial actors on the Internet; and the possibility of combining data 
from multiple online sources, appeared as potentially significant. This increased focus on knowledge 
provoked curiosity as to the relations between knowledge and experiences, and the possible influences 
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of these on the users' privacy-related interactions in social media. On this background, four main 
themes for the study were described, and later versions of the interview guide were built around these 
themes
 37
. The four themes are: 1) General information of Facebook usage; 2) Skills, knowledge & 
competences; 3) Behavior, choices & attitudes in actual use situations; and 4) Experiences, 
reflections, & motivation. The presentation of findings in section 5 is organized according to the four 
themes. 
 
In general, the interview guide was developed throughout the second pilot study. Some revisions 
were applied in relation to the first four interviews of the main study, but following these, the 
interview guide was kept unchanged for the rest of the data collection process. The changes applied in 
the main study was mainly about changing sequence of some questions (leaving the most sensitive 
questions to the end of the interview, for example), as well as leaving out and reducing the volume of 
some questions to avoid too lengthy interviews. The research questions were revised recurrently 
throughout the research process as well, gradually shifting against their final state (section 1.2), where 
they are focusing on privacy, knowledge, user experiences, behavior, and age. 
4.3.2 Developing the research method 
An important lesson learned from the pilot studies is that privacy is a complicated area for the 
users, and a challenging theme to investigate. As mentioned, the absence of empirical data in the first 
pilot brought forward a reconsideration of the main data collection method for the study. In the second 
pilot, conducting the interviews revealed a difficulty of enticing free reflections related to this topic. 
These difficulties appeared as partly related to the privacy concept's sensitivity, and partly related to 
the rather abstract character the ideas of this concept tend to have in peoples' minds. To improve the 
odds of collecting a fruitful empirical material in the main study, I found it useful to put some effort on 
refining the interviewing techniques throughout the second pilot study.  
Subsequent to each interview, the interview guide was reviewed and revised, and gradually became 
more compatible with the complexity of the research topic. Reflections of the efficiency of different 
questions gave rise to the testing of different interviewing techniques, and also new questions based on 
thoughts and reflections from the pilot study participants were merged into the guide. The most 
important methodological changes to the interview guide in this phase was: 
 
 Clarifying and simplifying questions making them understandable for informants of all ages and 
knowledge levels  
 Repeating questions from different angles throughout the interview, to increase validity of data 
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 Extend use of direct questions and concrete examples giving the informants explicit starting 
points for reflections  
 Incorporating new questions based on thoughts and contributions from the participants 
 Testing and incorporating a diversity of interviewing techniques in order to elicit participants' 
attitudes and reflections. Table 3 present techniques tested with success, and included in the 
interview guide 
 
Technique Description 
General impersonal scenarios        General examples not related to persons. Present examples of general privacy-sensitive 
situations, impersonal, but assumedly relevant to the participant. Ask for reflections, 
emotions, and assumed choices in a similar situation. 
Specific impersonal scenarios Concrete examples of other people's privacy choices. Present examples of other peoples' 
privacy-sensitive situations, assumedly relevant to the participant. Ask for reflections, 
emotions, and assumed choices in a similar situation. 
The outsider perspective    Viewing self throught the eyes of a potential perpetrator. Ask the participant to view 
herself through the eyes of a potential perpetrator. Ask for reflections and perspectives 
of themselves in the perspective of this malignant outsider 
Rankings by use of Likert 
scales (scenarios, self-
reported knowledge, etc.) 
Present a liste of (e.g.) privacy-sensitive scenarios. Ask the participant to rank these by 
level of gravity using a Likert scale. Ask for reflections and emotions related to each 
scenario 
Review of privacy settings Walkthrough of the informants own privacy settings on Facebook. Ask for reflections, 
emotions, and reasons for choice of settings. 
Other aspects 
 
 Inviting a relaxed and open-minded atmosphere, where  
- it is comfortable to talk about unsuccessful situations, undesirable disclosure, etc.,  
- focus is kept on positive incidents and situations the participant handled with 
success, as well 
 Varying focus between threats and incidents on a general level, and more concrete 
situations requiring the participant to focus on own reactions, thoughts, and choices 
 Presenting concrete examples early in the inteview, to concertize and evoke the 
participants' thoughts and reflections on the topic of privacy 
Likert-type rating scales are good to elicit a range of responses that can be compared across 
respondents, and is an essential tool in HCI for measuring aspects as opinions, attitudes and beliefs 
related to the user experience (Kaptein, Nass, & Markopoulos, 2010; Sharp, et al., 2007). The use of 
these scales in interview questions introduced a simple, quantitative element to the study. For some 
questions, the participants were asked to choose between a number of predefined answers, usually five 
alternatives. And commonly, they were asked to complement their choice by thoughts and reflections 
on the issue, too. In this way, some quantitative value was assigned to the qualitative nature of the data 
in the study. 
In the process of revising the interview guide, the guide gradually became more structured. To 
avoid closing the dialogue too much to my own, predefined categories, focus was kept on leaving 
Table 3: Interviewing techniques 
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room for reflections in answers by extensive use of follow-up questions, and by shifting between 
closed
38
 and open questions.  
4.4 Main study 
When no new information is brought in by collecting additional data, the point of saturation 
(informational redundancy) is found (Qual. Research Guidelines Project, 2011). The process of 
sampling, collecting, and analyzing data in pilots and in the main study, went on until this point of 
saturation was reached. Interviews, review of audio recordings, and transcriptions were processed in 
parallel throughout the data collection process, allowing information from high-level analysis to 
inform subsequent data collection decisions. As detailed previously (4.3), the data collection process 
was designed throughout the pilot studies primarily. This section reviews the sampling part of the data 
collection process; how sampling was designed, and how this design translated into practice (4.4.1). 
The subsequent process of detailed data analysis was separated into two main phases; a first, 
qualitative phase where the method Systematic Text Condensation was employed, was succeeded by a 
second phase characterized by the use of more quantitative analysis techniques. These two analysis 
phases are further described in subsection 4.4.2.  
4.4.1 Data collection 
4.4.1.1 Designing the sampling process 
Purposive sampling is the process of selecting participants purposively in order to recruit the 
participants most relevant for the research questions. This is the most often recommended approach in 
qualitative research, attempting to 'establish a good correspondence between research questions and 
sampling' (Bryman, 2008, p. 458). The sampling strategy chosen for this study initially aimed at 
combining two purposive sampling methods; intensity sampling and snowball sampling.  
 
Intensity sampling is 'the process of selecting or searching for rich or excellent examples of the 
phenomenon of interest' (Qual. Research Guidelines Project, 2011), where focus is kept on 
information-rich, but not extreme cases. To capture these rich examples of the phenomenon of interest, 
a set of selection criteria are specified; for this study defined as age and level of Facebook activity.  
 
The major selection criterion related to participants’ age. Young people are early adopters of social 
media, and from the very beginning Facebook was an arena for the youth, primarily. This trend has 
changed over time, and by the end of 2009, adult users made up the strongest growing group of users 
(Brandtzæg & Lüders, 2009). Assuming that an individual’s degree of experience with social media 
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influences her privacy choices and strategies, the age selection was aimed at recruiting users below 20 
years of age, and another group of users above 45 years of age, in order to do age-based comparisons 
of the findings within the two groups.  
 
Another selection criteria used has been the participants' level of Facebook activity, defined as a 
minimum Facebook friends count of 150
39
, a minimum number of 5 weekly logins, as well as 
describing their own Facebook activity as 'using Facebook actively' (determined at the participants' 
own discretion). The sampling strategy included an additional selection criterion of former experiences 
(aiming at including participants with negative privacy experiences from Facebook use). However, 
sampling by this criterion was not successful in practice. 
 
In snowball sampling, the information-rich cases described by the above criteria, would be 
identified by the benefit of people well-informed about the phenomenon, and in this way able to point 
out others as good examples for study. Following a chain of people leading up to such cases, this 
method can be useful for identifying a small number of key cases that are exemplars (Qual. Research 
Guidelines Project, 2011).  Snowball sampling is commonly used for populations (like the huge, 
diverse, and volatile population of Facebook) lacking a sampling frame
40
 from which a specific sample 
can be selected.  
Some general challenges associated to this choice of sampling strategy are discussed in chapter 6. 
4.4.1.2 Sampling in practice 
As few people volunteered to participate, recruiting informants for the study turned out as quite 
challenging, assumedly due to the topic of the study. As to intensity sampling, the two selection 
criteria age and level of Facebook activity was presented in the invitation
41
 to participate, and was 
successfully attended to in the sampling process. Selection based on the third criteria, former 
experiences, was planned for after snowball sampling. This was based on an expectation of 
participants to register in sufficient volumes for further selection. In practice, however, this strategy 
was too optimistic; the snowball never started to roll. Several attempts to roll the ball gave few results 
in both age groups, and the volumes of volunteers were not sufficient for selection based on the third 
selection criteria. In this situation, the snowball sampling strategy was abandoned
42
.  
 
For recruiting of adults, the invitation was presented on a dedicated web page, and the link to this 
page was distributed to a large number of randomly chosen people. The link was spread through 
                                                          
 
39 the average count of Facebook friends for a Norwegian user at the time of recruiting was in the range of 150-250 users 
40 a listing of all units in the population (Bryman, 2008) 
41 appendix B (in Norwegian only) 
42 out of 18 participants, only 2 were recruited by snowball sampling 
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different channels; Facebook, Twitter, as well as through personal contacts who kindly contributed by 
distributing information about the study in their own personal Facebook networks. Additional contacts 
with organizations with large audiences of relevance for this study, did not give results. In time, 
however, the extensive distribution of the invitation paid off, as adult participants from various 
contexts gradually volunteered for participation. In recruiting of youth participants, I was given useful 
support from the administration of a local high school. The invitation was distributed to all pupils 
through the school's intranet, and participants were included in the study based on a 'first come, first 
served' principle.  
 
In sum, sampling for this study is based on intensity sampling by the two criteria age and level of 
Facebook activity. Recruiting was sufficient to reach the level of saturation in data collection and 
analysis, but the total volumes of volunteers were not sufficient for selection based on the third 
selection criteria; former experiences. The research questions were adjusted according to this situation. 
The two groups of informants are presented in more detail in section 5.1. 
 
4.4.1.3 Interviews 
Data collection for the main study was carried out winter 2011/2012. 19 informants were 
interviewed, and all interviews were audio recorded. Due to technical problems, one recording was 
rejected, and data from 18 interviews are included in the empirical material for the study.  
As the interview guide, the research questions, and the interviewing techniques had been testet and 
refined iteratively in the two pilot studies, no major changes to the research design was introduced in 
in the main study. Some adjustments applied to the interview guide as a result of the first 3-4 
interviews (section 4.3). Following these initial adjustments of sequence and scale of the collection of 
interview questions, interviewing typically entailed asking identical questions in a predefined 
sequence. As the interview guide additionally were combining open and closed questions, the 
interview process was carried out as one might characterize as semi-structured interviews with some 
structured features.  
4.4.2 Data analysis 
In qualitative analysis, large volumes of data can be input to analysis. A main challenge for the 
researcher is to find a good way of coping with these volumes. A systematic approach to data analysis 
will expectedly contribute to the quality in the final results. Systematics will support in keeping an 
overview of the material and the analysis process, as well as in taking a step backwards in analysis 
whenever this is useful. Experiences from the second pilot indicated an approximate length of each 
interview of 1 hour. In the main study, interview lengths varied, depending on how much reflections 
and thoughts each participant wanted to share. 18 interviews resulted in approximately 22 hours of 
audio recordings. To handle this volume, a systematic approach to data analysis was required. The 
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empirical material was thoroughly prepared for analysis, and the choice of analysis method 
accommodated for the goal of the study, the qualitative nature of the data, as well as the theoretical 
foundations for the data analysis. This subsection deepens these choices and details how the analysis 
was carried out in practice. The theoretical model developed to support data analysis and the 
procedures related to the problem of measuring knowledge are presented, as well. 
4.4.2.1 A data-driven approach 
The 'Technology as Experience framework is 'not a method for analyzing experience, rather it is a 
set of conceptual tools or a language for thinking and talking about experience' (Wright, et al., 2005, p. 
52).  And as to 'Privacy For a Networked World', researchers within the HCI community currently 
focus on  bridging the gap between theory and practice related to this framework (Lampinen, et al., 
2011). The two theoretical frameworks chosen for 
this study do not provide detailed instructions for 
analysis, yet describe ideas, concepts, and a frame of 
understanding, increasing sensibility to the social, 
emotional, dynamic, and dialectic aspects of 
technology use. Lacking well-developed instructions, 
the data analysis was performed as a typical data-
driven process, and more than one analysis method 
was employed in this process to gain a thorough 
understanding of the empirical material. Methods and 
practical analysis procedures are further described in 
the following paragraphs.  
Based on Figure 9, a preliminary model of privacy 
literacy was developed to clarify main focus before entering the data analysis (Figure 11). Five tentative 
knowledge factors was added; Technology skills; Knowledge of risks; Notion of information 
sensitivity; Understanding exposure; and Assigning responsibilities. The analysis was concentrated on 
testing the validity of these knowledge factors, as well as on uncovering potential new pieces of the 
privacy literacy puzzle. The selection of knowledge factors was developed by reading previous studies 
of issues related to these issues; research as mentioned throughout this work, as well as in Howe, et al. 
(2012), and Iachello and Hong (2007). The factors Understanding exposure and Notion of information 
sensitivity, in particular, has been inspired by Rotman (2009), as well as by the three aspects of privacy 
described in DeCew (1997, pp. 74-80). 
  
Figure 11: Privacy literacy: A preliminary model 
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4.4.2.2 Preparing data for analysis 
Before going ahead with the interpretative analysis, raw data was prepared for analysis by 
transcription and autocoding43. This process had a partial overlap with the interview process. 
The audio files were transcribed in verbatim. A written, word-by-word translation of each file was 
produced, resulting in complete textual versions of each interview. An audio player software, Express 
Scribe
44
, was used to support the transcription process. Dedicated symbols were used to indicate 
hesitations, pauses, humor, etc., in the conversation. The transcriptions were given a standardized form 
as to headings and fonts, in this way suited for import into a CAQDAS
45
 tool. NVivo10
46
 software was 
used to autocode the data material.  
4.4.2.3 Analysis methods 
 'Your findings acquire significance in our intellectual community only when you have reflected 
on, interpreted, and theorized your data. You are not there as a mere mouthpiece.' (Bryman, 2008, p. 
554). The empirical material was ready for a process of interpretation and theorizing after transcription 
and autocoding. At the outset, the analysis process was based on the method Systematic Text 
Condensation (Malterud, 2002, 2003), a method theoretically anchored in phenomenological 
analysis
47
. This analysis method is well suited for studies like this, aiming at developing an 
understanding of the informants' experiences and lifeworld in a particular area. It provides a data-
driven approach to analysis, making it suitable for studies without a well-developed, instructive 
theoretical foundation for analysis, aiming at development of descriptions and concepts. And further, it 
is well suited for inexperienced researchers, as it emphasize reflexivity and systematics rather than 
extensive theoretical training (Malterud, 2003). In brief, Malterud
48
 describes four main phases of data 
analysis:  
 
1. Disentanglement: Uncovering core themes 
o Reading the collection of transcriptions consecutively, to get a general impression of the 
empirical material. In this process, core themes appear intuitively 
  
                                                          
 
43 in the autocoding process, the material is read into a software tool, and automatically structured. This indexing process  
    assists sorting and organizing the empirical data 
44 http://www.nch.com.au/ 
45 CADQAS tool = Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software  
46 http://www.qsrinternational.com/ 
47 as described in Giorgi, A. Sketch of a psychological phenomenological method, in Giorgi, A.(Ed.) Phenomenology and  
   psychological research (1985) 
48 translated to English, Malterud's original descriptions in Norwegian 
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2. Coding: Moving from themes to meaningful concepts 
o Organizing, sorting, and tagging/coding the data material according to themes. Through 
identification and classification are relevant parts of the texts separated from irrelevant  
3. Condensing: Transforming codes to meaning 
o Further abstracting the meaningful concepts from the previous phase. Codes are synthesized 
and condensed to subgroups through interpretation, and in this process, descriptions of a more 
general form are developed for each subgroup 
4. Recontextualization: Advancing condensations to descriptions and concepts 
o Validating of the findings by recontextualizing them to the empirical material and to the 
theoretical perspective for the study. Selecting quotes to illustrate and anchor the generalized 
descriptions, developing these into content descriptions for each subgroup  
 
More techniques were employed in the data analysis, as well. After several iterations of the phases 
of Systematic Text Condensation, the overall picture of the empirical data indicated strong common 
features within, as well as between, the age groups. To develop this picture further than the mere 
qualitative analysis provided for, the analysis was continued by use of other, more quantitative 
techniques. Triangulation of data analysis methods is a common approach in HCI (Sharp, et al., 2007), 
and its practical application in this study is further described in the next paragraph, Data Analysis in 
practice. 
4.4.2.4 Data analysis in practice 
Recurring iterations of data analysis was done in two main phases separated by methodological 
approach; the first, qualitative phase was followed by a second phase of a more quantitative character.  
 
In the first phase, the four stages of Systematic Text Condensation were applied. As a start, 
complete set of transcriptions was read consecutively. In this walkthrough, core themes appeared from 
the material, and were added to themes established ahead of data collection (Disentangling). This step, 
performed once to kick off the analysis, brought the following tentative themes further to the next 
phase: Knowledge vs. Insight; Control; Responsibilities; Intimacy, Former experiences; Information 
types; Attitudes vs. Behavior; Consideration; and Trust.  
In the following, focus iteratively shifted between the Coding, Condensing, and 
Recontextualization steps. Codes were gradually developed for each core theme, in a recurring process 
of splitting, sorting and rearranging the text material. The codes were successively transformed to 
subcategories, and more general impressions for each subcategory were developed. The theoretical 
perspective chosen for the study was used as a guide in this process. However, after recurring 
iterations, the analysis process gradually developed from the qualitative character as Malterud (2003) 
describes, into a next, more quantitative phase. At the outset, the empirical data had some predefined, 
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quantitative features, as a combination of Likert scale rankings and free reflections was chosen as one 
of several techniques in the interview guide (paragraph 4.3.2). And further, as I got more familiar with 
the empirical material, clear common features became apparent in the data, making them more 
quantifiable. This subsequent phase of analysis was characterized by counting, comparing, and 
summarizations in many iterations, recurrently validating the results against transcriptions to ensure 
they do not disconnect from their origin in the quantification process. The findings of this study are 
built in a typical bottom-up, data-driven process.  
 
The final results are presented by tables and diagrams, in addition the text-based descriptions 
commonly characterizing presentation of a qualitative data (chapter 5). Tables and numbers in this 
presentation are for illustrative purposes only, and claim no statistical significance. The NVivo10 
software was used to support efficiency in the sorting and retrieval of data throughout the analysis 
process. Data was structured gradually throughout the iterations, and to allow for comparisons 
between age groups, separate, but identical, data structures were developed for the two groups
49
. 
Management of analysis results was further supported by use of spreadsheets, mindmapping software, 
and text based descriptions. An analysis log was maintained to keep track of the process. The 
following paragraph details some aspects of the analysis procedures. 
4.4.2.5 A challenge in data analysis: measuring knowledge 
As described in the previous paragraphs, a simple version of Likert scale rankings has been used to 
support measuring of knowledge in this work. For some interview questions, the informants were 
asked to rank their answers on a five-point scale. This applies to questions related to self-reporting of 
knowledge in particular, but rankings were used for other questions, as well. In analysis of data, Likert 
scales were used as a tool for evaluating the participants for knowledge factors not based on self-
reporting, rather on the researcher's interpretation and assessment of results. This procedure do not 
provide objective measures for individuals' knowledge, yet provides a way of quantifying the results 
which allows for comparisons as well as indicating differences and similarities between individual 
informants, as well as between the two groups of adults and youths.  
 
The same scale was used in all interview questions based on rankings. The values were generally 
presented as text values, not as number values. The Likert scale used in interview questions consist of 
the following five values: very good (5); pretty good (4); good (3); not so good (2); and poor (1). In 
the presentation of the results, the expressions medium value, weaker, and stronger are used. In these 
cases, the five values are converted to a three-point scale, in order to set off tendencies in the data. The 
                                                          
 
49 one of these data structures is shown in Appendix C 
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conversion was done by merging value 1 and 2 to low, and to let value 3 represent medium, and 
merging value 4 and 5 to high. Generally, and also anticipating the course of events, Table 4 
summarizes the aspects included in the measurement of each of the six knowledge factors of privacy 
literacy proposed in this study. 
4.5 Research method – a review 
This study has been carried out with a qualitative, iterative, and data-driven approach to data 
collection and data analysis. Data was collected in qualitative interviews, and informants were 
sampled purposively based on their age and level of Facebook activity. The research design was 
developed gradually, as two pilots were conducted ahead of the main study. Data collection and 
analysis was done iteratively, and triangulation of methods was introduced in both phases by 
complementing the qualitative main approach by quantitative techniques. 
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Knowledge factor Component Description 
TECHNOLOGY SKILLS Technology skills: all areas the answers in all skill areas were converted from the five-point to a three-point scale as described in paragraph 4.4.2.5. The 
figure show the distribution of the set of all answers on this three-point scale (in percentage) 
 PC and Internet use self-reported value 
 Facebook use self-reported value 
 Facebook privacy settings self-reported value 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF RISKS Knowledge of risks (overview) reflects the final image of knowledge of risks (the adjusted value) converting answers to the three-point scale (see 4.4.2.5) 
 Knowledge of risks (self-reported) self-reported value 
 Knowledge of risks (adjusted) estimated in analysis:  
the self-reported knowledge of risks was adjusted by individual risk awareness profiles construed by: 
reviewing complete transcriptions from the interviews, building a qualitative impression of each informant's 
o general risk focus (to what extent are the informant focusing on threats in general and assigning importance to these) 
o knowledge of actual threats (which threats did the informant mention and express familiarity to, and to what extent was 
each of these assigned importance) 
o attitude to preventive actions (to what extent is the informant prepared to accept the costs related to preventive actions) 
each individual profile was summarized in text form, and then translated to a risk awareness rank on the five-point Likert 
scale used in the informants' self-reports 
NOTION OF INFORMATION 
SENSITIVITY 
Self-identifying information 
Access-enabling information 
Expressive information 
estimated in analysis: 
by reviewing complete transcriptions, a qualitative impression was built of each informant's 
o each participants' view of the importance of protecting the respective information 
the answers were ranked on a three point scale: High, Medium, Low 
UNDERSTANDING EXPOSURE Understanding exposure in general estimated in analysis: 
by reviewing interview data, building an impression of each informant's 
o understanding of the general concepts data persistence and data virality 
o consideration of these aspects in privacy decisions 
and the answers were ranked on a three point scale: High, Medium, Low 
 Understanding exposure in 
Facebook Core 
estimated in analysis: 
by reviewing interview data, building an impression of each informant's 
o understanding of the level of exposure allowed for in default privacy settings for own Facebook wall (example) 
o understanding of the change in privacy context when sharing on another user's Facebook wall (example) 
o understanding of Facebook's privacy settings, and how these are configured (interview data) 
and the answers were ranked on a three point scale: High, Medium, Low 
 
 Understanding exposure in 
Facebook Platform 
estimated in analysis: 
by reviewing interview data, building an impression of each informant's 
o understanding of increased exposure and potential risks related to accepting apps unconditionally (example) 
o understanding of increased exposure and potential risks related to accepting app asking for extensive auth.'s (example) 
o understanding of  the relation between Core functions and Platform functions on Facebook (interview data) 
and the answers were ranked on a three point scale: High, Medium, Low 
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Knowledge factor Component Description 
 Understanding exposure in 
Facebook Platform revisited 
estimated in analysis: 
after the walkthrough of the informant's actual exposure in Facebook Platform, the value estimated for Exposure in 
Facebook Platform was adjusted for each informant  
o being unaware of central aspects of own exposure in Facebook Platform  
o expressing an attitude and experience of own exposure in Facebook Platform in mismatch with the actual exposure 
ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITES  estimated in analysis: 
by reviewing interview data, building an impression of each informant's 
o view the responsibility of other parties like the service provider and public authorities for protecting own information 
against misuse (interview data) 
o view own responsibility for protecting own information against misuse (interview data) 
o view the main responsible for protecting own information against misuse (interview data) 
and the answers were separated by agree/disagree that the main responsibility lies with the user 
 
ACTUAL EXPOSURE ON FACEBOOK Protecting information on Facebook 
(overview) 
this figure is an informal illustration of the findings in the three areas of Facebook use and is not based on accurate numbers 
from the analysis of exposure 
EXPERIENCES OF PRIVACY ON 
FACEBOOK 
Experiencing vulnerability on 
Facebook (overview) 
estimated in analysis:  
by summing the values estimated for The basic experience of security, Views of self as a potential target, and Notion of 
information sensitivity for own, personal information. 
 The basic experience of security 
 
estimated in analysis:  
by reviewing complete transcriptions, a qualitative impression was built of each informant's  
o basic sense of security 
and these impressions were ranked on a three-point scale: a basic sense of security; a moderate sense of security;  and a basic 
sense of insecurity 
 Views of self as a potential target 
 
estimated in analysis:  
by reviewing interview data, a qualitative impression was built of each informant's  
o view of self as a target for a potential perpetrator 
these impressions were represented on a three-point scale: probably not interesting; possibly interesting; and probably 
interesting 
 Notion of information sensitivity 
for own, personal information 
estimated in analysis: 
by reviewing complete transcriptions, a qualitative impression was built of each informant's 
o each participants' view of the importance of protecting their own, personal information 
and the answers were ranked on a three point scale: High, Medium, Low 
Table 4: Detailed procedures for measuring knowledge in data analysis 
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5. DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the findings uncovered in the analysis of empirical data. Analysis has been 
concentrated on the three main themes of privacy literacy reflected in Figure 11; KNOWLEDGE, 
BEHAVIOR, and the user EXPERIENCE, to see if the joined forces of this trio improve our understanding 
of the research questions (section 4.1). The chapter is organized according to these three themes. 
  
As a start, section 5.1 introduces the informants and some characteristics of their Facebook use. 
Section 5.2 looks into the results from measurement of five elements of their privacy KNOWLEDGE; 
Technology skills (5.2.1),  Assigning responsibilities for protecting information against misuse on 
Facebook (5.2.2), Knowledge of risks (5.2.3), Notion of information sensitivity of three categories of 
information (5.2.4), and  finally, their Understanding of exposure of information on this social 
networking service (5.2.5). As a review of the findings in this section, each of these knowledge 
elements is evaluated as strong, improvable, or weak, respectively (5.2.6). In addition to text based 
descriptions and transcripts from the interviews, results are presented by use of simple quantifications 
in figures and tables. Quantifications are used for illustrative purposes only; the use of numbers and 
figures do not claim any statistical significance. Refer to paragraph 4.4.2.5 for descriptions of the 
detailed analysis procedures. Each transcript in this presentation is identified by a combination
50
 of:  
1) Transcript number 2) Age group (Youth/Adult); 3) Interview number
51
, and 4) Gender: 
(Female/Male). 
 
Section 5.3 reviews some decisions made by participants' in their actual use of the Facebook 
service; decisions that do have consequences for the exposure of their personal information on the 
Internet. These representations of actual BEHAVIOR, associated to Facebook Core (5.3.1), Facebook 
Platform (5.3.2), and Facebook Security (5.3.3), respectively, strengthen and supplement the 
impressions of informants' knowledge gathered in the analysis of KNOWLEDGE. A review is found in 
paragraph 5.3.4. 
 
In a third perspective, section 5.4 elaborates the participants' EXPERIENCES of Facebook use by 
investigating the emotions and attitudes involved. This investigation deepens and reinforces the 
understanding of the informants' knowledge developed in the two preceding sections. A basic sense of 
security (5.4.1) and an experience of invulnerability (5.4.2) were found as pronounced aspects of the 
                                                          
 
50 as an example, the identifier (#1:Y6F) translates to: Transcript 1; Youth group - Interview 6; Female informant 
51
 a separate numbering sequence is used for each age group: 1..9 for adults and 1..10 for youths (one youth interview was  
    rejected due to technical problems) 
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overall experience. Subsection 5.4.3 raises questions to the fragility of the general experience, and 
5.4.4 sums up findings from this section.  
 
Section 5.5 finalizes the analysis chapter by reviewing the findings from this study.  
5.1 Informants 
To reveal potential differences related to age, knowledge, behavior, and user experiences were 
investigated in two groups of informants. In tota1, 18 participants contributed
52
; 9 young people from 
16 to 18 years of age, and 9 adults aged 46-59. Genders have proximate representation within both 
groups. All participants use the service actively, most teens as 
perpetually available online and adults typically as logging on 
and off the service several times a day. Except 2 young 
participants, all contributors view Facebook as their preferred 
and most used SNS. 
 
Table 5 reflects the size of the informants' networks of Facebook 
friends. On the average
53
, young participants had approximately 
twice the number of Facebook friends as adults. Peak friend 
counts observed were 1200/500 and the lowest 232/150, for teens 
and adults respectively. 
 
All participants except two had Facebook membership duration 
of 2-5 years at the time of interviewing (Table 6). The remaining 
(both adults) had 9 months, and 7 weeks of membership, 
respectively. All informants maintain a personal user profile
54
 on 
Facebook. 
 
Except one adult using the service mainly as a tool for self-
presentation for professional purposes, all participants use the 
service as most personal users do: to stay in touch with friends and family, and to participate in the 
mutual sharing of photos, links, status updates and comments in a variety of social contexts. Young 
participants prefer personal messages and chat
55
 to communicate with other Facebook users; adults 
                                                          
 
52 refer to subsection 4.4.1 for more information about the sampling process and  informants 
53 average/median 656/540 for youths vs. 301/320 for adults 
54 as opposed to maintaining a Facebook Page 
55 the functions for exchanging personal messages asynchronously and online chat are merged to one, common function on 
    Facebook 
Friends count Teens Adults 
151-250 1 3 
251-350 0 4 
351-750 5 2 
750 < 3 0 
Table 5: Facebook friends counts 
Member since Teens Adults 
2007 4 5 
2008 2 1 
2009 3 1 
2011/12 0 2 
Table 6: Membership durations 
Communication Teens Adults 
Wall 0 4 
Wall and chat 0 4 
Chat 9 1 
Table 7: Preferred way of communicating 
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generally prefer to communicate by sharing on their Facebook wall, using personal messages as a 
supplementary method for communication (Table 7).  
 
The sample of informants assumedly includes some participants more interested in the question of 
privacy in social media than the average Norwegian social media user. The young informants was 
recruited from a local high school with digital technologies as a particular area of commitment, and 
some potentially take more interest in technology related questions than the average teenager. 
Similarly, about one half of the adults, by virtue of their educational or occupational experience, 
assumedly take more interest in this study's topic than most people. The young participants were 
recruited from different branches of study, and with one exception adults have different occupational 
backgrounds. 
5.2 Knowledge 
This section presents findings related to the measurement of each of the five elements of 
KNOWLEDGE from the preliminary model of privacy literacy in Figure 11; Technology skills (5.2.1), 
Assigning responsibilities (5.2.2), Knowledge of risks (5.2.3), Notion of information sensitivity (5.2.4), 
and Understanding exposure (5.2.5). A brief review is presented in 5.2.6.  
5.2.1 Technology skills 
As measuring each informant's technology skills separately would be beyond the scope of this 
study, the evaluation of this knowledge element was based on the participants' self-reports. 
Participants were asked to rank their knowledge 
within three areas of Technology skills - 
knowledge of PC and Internet use, knowledge of 
Facebook use, and knowledge of Facebook privacy 
settings - using a five-point Likert scale
56
. To give 
a general impression of self-reports, Figure 12 
reflects the pattern of all answers in all skill 
areas
57
. Informants generally ranked their 
Technology skills as high to medium and the youth 
rated their skills somewhat higher than adults. The following subsections describe each skill area in 
more detail and show an exception from the general pattern in one of the areas. 
                                                          
 
56 the scale used is: very good, pretty good, good, not so good, and poor 
57 to create this model, as well as similar models in this chapter, answers were converted to a three-point scale. Refer in 
general to paragraph 4.4.2.5 for a description of the detailed analysis procedures 
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5.2.1.1 Knowledge of PC and Internet use  
The young participants view themselves as competent users of PC and the Internet, and characterize 
their knowledge as pretty good or very good (Figure 13). Adults generally report high knowledge in this 
area too, yet a few ratings by the middle level value good are reported, as well. The high ratings in this 
area may reflect a participant group of experienced technology users. Most participants have a quite 
long Facebook membership duration (section 5.1) and describe themselves as experienced users. In the 
words of one of the young participants:   
I would say that [my knowledge of PC and Internet use] is 'pretty good'... I have been using a 
PC for a great many years (#2:Y6F) 
Three adult informants ranked their knowledge 
lower than the others for all areas of self-reported 
knowledge. Two of these have a short Facebook 
membership duration; 9 months and 7 weeks.  The 
third adult seems to assess his knowledge by more 
strict criteria than others. This informant did not 
give an impression of lower knowledge than the 
others throughout the interview. 
 
Many participants stress that rankings in this area 
express knowledge of functionality, rather than knowledge of a technical character. Two informants, 
one from each of the age groups, demonstrated technical knowledge throughout the interview. 
5.2.1.2 Knowledge of Facebook use 
A similar rating is seen for the area knowledge of 
Facebook use. The young informants view 
themselves as competent users of Facebook, as 
adults do too, but with a slightly lower rating. 
Overall, 14 of 18 participants rank their knowledge 
in this area as pretty good or very good (Figure 14). 
 
 
  
Figure 13: Technology skills: PC and Internet use 
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5.2.1.3 Knowledge of Facebook privacy settings 
Some more pronounced age differences are visible 
in the area knowledge of Facebook privacy 
settings. Most young participants rank their 
knowledge as very good or pretty good, and 
express a familiarity with these settings in general 
(Figure 15). On the other hand, two thirds of the 
adults rank this knowledge by the middle level 
value good.  
 
Informants in the youth group typically described Facebook privacy settings as straightforward:  
I think [the settings] are very clear and straightforward, so I think I am in pretty good control 
of… how you [take care of] your privacy on Facebook (#3:Y4M) 
However, several participants reflected upon the high rate of changes the privacy settings, and the 
need to constantly update their knowledge that these changes bring about: 
I have been [a Facebook] user for a couple of years… so I am quite familiar with settings and 
things. But Facebook updates [the functionality] continually, so… you have to start over from 
scratch at times (#4:Y3F) 
About one half of the adults find knowledge of Facebook privacy settings as not very important, as 
long as they restrict the information being shared on Facebook:  
[privacy settings] might not be what I have been emphasizing the most… there is [no 
information] in there that I cannot answer for, and there are no pictures that… are crossing any 
lines. So… I have not spent too much time on [learning them] (#5:A1F) 
5.2.1.4 Technology skills – a review 
Most participants describe their Technology skills as very good and pretty good within the areas 
knowledge of PC and Internet use and knowledge of Facebook use. Exceptions from this are made for 
a few informants with a short Facebook membership duration, as well as one (assumed) case of under-
reporting. Age differences were observed in the area knowledge of Facebook privacy settings in 
particular, where 2/3 of the adults use the middle level value good, whereas 2/3 of the youth rated it as 
very good and pretty good. Values in the not so good and poor categories were rarely used in reporting 
of Technology skills. 
  
Figure 15: Technology skills: Facebook privacy settings 
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5.2.2 Assigning responsibilities 
Who has, in the informants' view, a responsibility for protecting their personal information against 
misuse once shared? And how do they view their own responsibility as compared to other parties like 
the service provider and public authorities for privacy and information security (legislation, the 
Norwegian Data Inspectorate, etc.)?  
 
One young informant sums up her answer in a way typical for participants in both age groups: 
Well, the main responsible is me, obviously… And next comes Facebook; they are obliged to 
provide… privacy settings that protect… the information we share against misuse… [Public 
authorities] have to be part of it, too, I think. We need better information on how to protect 
ourselves, at the same time as they should impose restrictions on what people may or may not 
do (#6:Y3F)  
Informants do, with a very few exceptions, agree that the main responsibility for protection of 
personal data against misuse lies with the user. Most of them view the service provider (Facebook) and 
the public authorities as sharing a joint responsibility. They all recognize themselves as the main 
responsible for protecting the information they share against misuse and no one expects other bodies to 
protect their personal data in place of themselves. In sum, the informants do recognize a central 
responsibility for protection of their own, personal data against misuse. 
5.2.3 Knowledge of risks 
The informants' knowledge of risks was evaluated based on self-reports, as well as on an additional 
tuning of the self-report scores by individual risk awareness profiles construed in data analysis. As 
reflected in Figure 16, Knowledge of risks for 2/3 of 
the informants was found high. Some differences 
between the age groups were observed, which are 
detailed in 5.2.3.1. 
 
The individual risk awareness profiles were 
created from a collection of all statements of risk 
awareness expressed by each informant throughout 
the interviews. The profiles were used to 
supplement and adjust the self-reported knowledge scores (5.2.3.2).  In addition, these profiles gave 
valuable information about what threats the informants know and recognize as important. The 
informants' views of threats are summarized in the paragraphs 5.2.3.3 to 5.2.3.5. 
  
Figure 16: Knowledge of risks: overview 
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5.2.3.1 Knowledge of risks as reported by the informants 
Participants were asked to rank their risk 
knowledge by the five-point scale. All young 
informants ranked this knowledge as pretty good 
and very good  (Figure 17). The adult rankings were 
more distributed throughout the scale; one half of 
the adult group ranked their knowledge as pretty 
good or very good, and the other half rank as good 
or not so good. Three of the four adults in this 
latter half are the same informants that ranked their 
knowledge lower for self-reported knowledge in general, this means that two of the four lower 
rankings may be closely related to a low level of technology experience and a third is most probably 
due to an element of under-reporting. 
5.2.3.2 Tuning knowledge scores by individual risk awareness profiles 
To complement the image of risk knowledge collected by the informants' self-reports, additional 
analyses of the risk knowledge expressed throughout the interviews were carried out. The analyses 
resulted in individual  risk awareness profiles for 
all informants. These profiles were used to adjust 
the self-reported risk knowledge scores, with the 
purpose of passing these scores through a simple 
validation process. The correspondence between 
the self-reports and the risk knowledge expressed 
in interviews were quite high, and adjusting self-
report scores by individual profiles did not suggest 
any major changes. A one-step downgrade of the 
scores for two young participants, as well as a 
one-step downgrade and a two-step upgrade for two adult participants, resulted from this process. In 
sum, the suggested adjustments did not change the general impression from Figure 16 of participants 
generally aware of risks (Figure 18). Still, some risks get less attention from the informants than others; 
the informants' views of threats are developed in the next paragraphs. 
5.2.3.3 Most focused threats 
When assembling data for the individual risk awareness profiles, an overview of all privacy threats 
in focus during the interviews was recorded. A further analysis of this overview gave information 
indicating which threats are known to and recognized as important by informants. An overview of the 
Figure 17: Knowledge of risks: self-reported 
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most focused threats is presented in Table 8, and the least focused threats in Table 9. High concurrence in foci 
was observed across age groups and the views are presented as common for both groups. Column 1 in 
the tables, the 'Focused by' column, reflects how many of the total of 18 participants that were 
focusing on the current threat in the interview.  
 
ID thefts were identified as the top threat, mentioned by all informants, and commonly brought up 
several times throughout the interviews: 
… it is really grave… like getting a mental roofing tile in your head… a 'Facerape' would be 
bad enough… Identity theft is truly a worst case scenario (#7:A4F) 
Commercial infringements and spam came secondly. The two age groups differed in perspectives in 
this area, and some aspects are further detailed in a separate paragraph (5.2.3.5).  
 
 
 
                                                          
 
58 refer to subsection 2.1.1 for definitions 
59 also referred to as 'Facerape' 
60 one of the most common types of confidence frauds for monetary gain, based on advance fee payment 
Focused by Threat Description 
18/18 ID thefts Identity thefts58. Also included are integrity violations by someone 
assuming to be you on Facebook; like creating a fake Facebook 
profile, or the unauthorized use of a valid Facebook profile59 
 
17/18 Commercial infringements 
and spam 
Utilization of personal information for commercial  purposes 
(advertising, resale), incl. mass distribution information (spam) 
15/18 Fraud Financial fraud. Misuse of bank account number or payment 
information. Also in focus: Nigerian Scam60 
15/18 Data virality Integrity violations by undesirable dispersion of personal information 
14/18 Conceived vulnerabilities in 
Facebook Core or Platform 
Undesirable exposure of personal information due to Facebook core 
functionality/complexity, or software by 3rd parties via Facebook 
Platform 
 
13/18 Physical security (person) Violations of person/body, i.e. stalking, abuse, assault 
13/18 Hacking Computer hacking, user account hacking 
11/18 Physical security (property) Violations of property, i.e. housebreaking, thefts 
10/18 Data persistence Integrity violations by undesirable storage of personal information 
9/18 Malware (computer viruses) Malicious computer programs with ability to replicate and spread to 
other computers 
Table 8: Most focused threats 
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Data virality and data persistence are general characteristics of digitized information rather than 
actual threats, but these phenomena were stressed as threats by many informants and by this reason 
included as separate categories of threats. These aspects are further explored in paragraph 5.2.5.1. 
 
Conceived vulnerabilities in Facebook Core and Facebook Platform were focused in both age groups, 
but from different angles. Young participants tended to focus on complexity and volatility in the 
privacy settings in Facebook Core, whereas adults were more concerned about lack of control over 
personal information by undesirable sharing through third party applications in Facebook Platform.  
 
Physical security was focused by both groups; adults as focusing mostly on protection of home and 
property, the young participants' focused primarily on their own, as well as their friends' physical 
security. 
5.2.3.4 Least focused threats 
It is interesting to look into the threats that were the least focused in the interviews, as well. Table 9 
reviews the threats focused by a maximum of 3/18 participants. A striking property of this table is how 
it incorporates threats of current importance. For example, the Norwegian National Security Authority 
characterize social engineering, phishing, and malicious links like Trojans as major threats currently 
and in the years to come (NSM, 2010), but the focus on these seems low among informants. 
 
Focused by Threat Description 
3/18 Malware (malicious links) Malicious software hidden in web links, i.e. Trojans, spyware 
3/18 Coupling Undesirable (and possibly unauthorized) access to personal information 
by combining data from multiple sources 
3/18 Subscription services Undesirable registration on subscription-based services 
3/18 Social engineering Manipulation/elicitation by misuse of personal information 
2/18 Cookie tracking Tracking of a user's web interaction by downloading bits of text 
(cookies) to a web browser 
2/18 Malware (session hi-
jacking) 
Exploitation of a valid computer session to gain access to a computer 
system 
2/18 Malware (keylogger) Unauthorized software logging of user keyboard strokes 
2/18 Phishing Digital snooping for personal information by passing oneself off as a 
trusted source 
 
 
Another matter worth noticing is how threats typically named by key terms from the security area 
are found in this table of low-focus threats. Threats like cookie tracking, keylogging and session hi-
jacking was mentioned solely by two informants with more technical interest and competence than the 
other participants. These threats were not mentioned by alternative terms either. These findings 
Table 9: Least focused threats 
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demonstrate a low focus on particular threats among participants, and may indicate a lack of 
knowledge of these threats, as well.  
5.2.3.5 Age differences in views on commercial infringements of personal information 
Commercial infringements of personal information, was focused from different perspectives by 
adults and young participants (Table 10). The adults expressed high concerns for the service providers' 
undesirable utilization of their own data in advertising, and for the unauthorized resale of data to third 
parties, in particular. Young participants on the 
other hand, focused primarily on spam in the form 
 of excessive advertising based on personal 
information. They generally found excessive 
advertising very annoying.   
 
All informants were asked to comment on the 
statement in Figure 19. Just a few young 
participants felt familiar with the idea of personal 
information as means of payment for services. Most adults found this assertion reasonable: 
I find [the assertion] appropriate… It is uncomfortable, but very appropriate (#8:A4F) 
Except a few mentioning a potential income for 
Facebook from advertising, the young informants 
generally had few ideas of how Facebook is 
making money by providing a free service to 
hundreds of millions of users: 
 
I have not thought about that… I don't know if Facebook earns any money from our sharing of 
information… I don't think they do that, actually (#9:Y6F) 
5.2.3.6 Knowledge of risks – a review 
The analysis of participants' Knowledge of risks reveals a quite high awareness of risks among 
informants in general, among youths a little higher than for adults. Validation of the self-reported 
knowledge scores by individual risk awareness profiles did not change the general impression of the 
knowledge scores from self-reports, yet provided useful information about the most and least focused 
threats. The overviews of threats revealed how some threats of current importance, like social 
engineering, coupling, and phishing, get a rather low focus within both groups of informants. And 
further, the young informants expressed low concerns for the potential misuse of personal information 
for commercial purposes, and generally keep a high focus on protecting their own as well as others' 
Different views on 
commercial infringements 
Teens Adults 
Commercial use of personal 
information: main concern 
spam misuse 
Recognize the idea of personal 
information as means of 
payment for services 
2/9 8/9 
Table 10: Different views on commercial infringements 
Figure 19: Personal information as means of payment 
Some would claim that people pay for their 
Facebook membership by their own personal 
information, as they have to provide this 
information to create a user account and to get 
access to services like third party applications. 
What do you think about this assertion? 
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physical security. As to conceived vulnerabilities in Facebook Core or Platform, young people 
generally focused on Facebook Core, and adults expressed higher concerns for the potentially 
undesirable disclosure of information through Facebook Platform. 
5.2.4 Notion of information sensitivity 
Are some categories of personal information viewed as more or less vulnerable for misuse as 
others? To get an impression of their notion of sensitivity of different kinds of personal information, 
three information categories of were introduced to the informants; self-identifying, access-enabling, 
and expressive information. Each category was introduced by a brief description, and concretized by 
examples of information elements of this category that is typically shared on Facebook. From this 
starting point, informants were asked to what extent they want to limit others' access to the 
information category in question. In general, self-identifying and access-enabling information were 
viewed as of high to medium sensitivity, whereas expressive information was valued distinctly lower. 
The informants' views of sensitivity for the three information categories are detailed in the following.  
5.2.4.1 Views on self-identifying information 
 Self-identifying information (SI) reveals elements of your identity and tell others who you are. This 
category was exemplified by name, date-of-birth, education, profession, family relations, health, and  
private economy. The young informants view this information having high sensitivity, whereas the 
adults view it as of medium to high sensitivity (Figure 20). Informants in both age groups emphasized 
security risks as their main consideration related to 
sharing of SI (Table 11), and identity thefts was the 
most often mentioned risk. 
 
Name and date-of-birth are mandatory information 
when registering for a user account on Facebook. 
All participants have registered for a Facebook 
account using their real name. Some of the young 
informants emphasized how they intentionally left 
their middle name out, in order to make it more 
difficult for others to use their name in searches for further information on the Internet. Facebook 
provides the option of hiding year of birth from the user profile, and several informants utilize this 
Figure 20: Notion of information sensitivity: Self-identifying 
information 
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functionality. Showing the complete date-of-birth are considered as sensitive by some, as this makes 
up the first six digits of the 11-digit social security number
61
 used in Norway:  
… year of birth is … one factor in the social security number… By removing this, you are 
cutting back on available information… [The SSN] is… key to a lot of services… like… internet 
banking for instance (#10:A8M) 
Health and economy are information elements that 
most (16/18) participants wants to restrict others' 
access to; due to risks of misuse for some or due to  
the personal character of this information for 
others. Sharing information about education and 
occupation was generally seen as unproblematic. 
5.2.4.2 Views on access-enabling information 
Access-enabling information (AI) provides access to people in various ways, in the real world, or 
on the Internet. This category was exemplified by telephone number, address, current location, and 
information about a future location and when you plan to stay there.  
 
 As reflected in Figure 21, all informants rate AI as of high to medium sensitivity. The young 
participants, though, did express an even higher focus on protecting information of this kind 
throughout the interviews. A similar focus on 
protecting information from this category was not 
observed among the participants in the group of 
adults. 
 
The young participants keep a high focus on 
limiting access to address or location information 
in order to protect their physical security; their 
own, or their friends' security. They say they are 
likely to share information about their location, 
but not as specific as the exact address or exact time of day. One informant describes how she finds it 
safer to geotag public places rather than tagging exact, private addresses: 
                                                          
 
61 in Norwegian: Personnummer 
Information sensitivity:                         
main consideration 
Teens Adults 
Self-identifying information security  security  
Access-enabling information security  security  
Expressive information identity identity 
Table 11:  Notion of information sensitivity: main 
consideration 
Figure 21: Notion of information sensitivity: Access-enabling 
information 
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Exact address… I would not share that with everybody. If I do, it would be easy to seek me up…  
if I go to town with a friend, or to the movies…okey, but… I rarely share the exact address that I 
am staying at… (#11:Y10F) 
Others describe how they share location information by using fake location names instead of exact 
geotagging, and in this way disguising the message for others than its intended recipients. Young 
participants keep a high focus on protecting their mobile phone number and email address, as well, yet 
the motivation for protecting these information elements seems to be to avoid annoying spam, rather 
than to protect their security. 
 
Four adult participants find it important to limit others' access to their address, mobile phone 
number, and email address. Five adults find it not so important to restrict access to this information, as 
this information would be possible to retrieve from other websites, for instance like the yellow pages. 
Location information is higher valued among the adults, the focus on restricting access to this 
information is mostly due to a purpose of protecting physical property:  
… my location, I rarely share that, and my future location…never…  if we write that we go on 
vacation, our house is left empty, you know (#12:A3M) 
5.2.4.3 Views on expressive information 
Expressive information (EI) is information about who you are, your likes and preferences. This 
category was exemplified by your likes and dislikes, how you spend your time, political viewpoints, as 
well as religious beliefs. All participants share information of this category with other Facebook users, 
as well as with third-parties.  
As shown in Figure 22, EI was rated lower than SI 
and AI by participants in general, and youths 
rated this information type lower than adults. 
Youths view this primarily as low to medium, 
whereas most adults rated it as medium. 
 
As to security issues particularly, the overall 
expression of sensitivity throughout the 
interviews was even lower than these numbers 
reflect, though. The previously mentioned focus 
on security issues seemed to fade when the informants were talking about expressive information. One 
of the adults answers similar to many participants when asked about what use he thinks others could 
do of his Facebook information if they had access to it: 
Figure 22: Notion of information sensitivity: Expressive 
information 
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… they probably would find out… that I … like  [interest]…  and that I do have some opinions 
about [topic], - they are welcome to use that! …@@@62... if they want to. … I don't really know 
[how this information could be misused] (#13:A3M) 
However, the participants' focus on identity and personal integrity was pronounced for EI as compared 
to SI and AI, especially among adults. Adults expressed a high focus on carefully selecting 
information for sharing with the purpose of presenting themselves in a way they find appropriate.  
5.2.4.4 Notion of information sensitivity: a review 
The three categories of information are viewed differently by the participants with regard to 
sensitivity. Self-identifying and access-enabling information were given high to medium sensitivity. 
Security risks are in focus when assigning importance to these categories. Young informants generally 
assess SI and AI a little higher than adults. Expressive information was assigned low to medium 
sensitivity, and adults generally assign EI a higher sensitivity than youths. Access restrictions to 
expressive information are most likely based on integrity considerations and the purpose of shaping 
one's own digital identity.  
5.2.5 Understanding exposure 
In order to understand the audience for the information we share about ourselves on the Internet, 
we need a general understanding of how information transforms in character when going from the 
physical to the digital world. And, in order to understand the audience for the information we share on 
Facebook in particular, it is vital to understand the exposure mechanisms on this service as well: 
exposure to other users via Facebook Core, and to third parties via Facebook Platform. To protect our 
privacy, we need to understand the rich selection of settings that Facebook offers its users, and how 
this service's sharing mechanisms work for a given combination of settings in different privacy 
contexts. The impression of knowledge in each of these three areas is detailed in the following 
paragraphs. Some variations were observed between areas, as well as between age groups.   
5.2.5.1 Increased exposure - a basic condition when digitizing information 
Data virality and data persistence are typical characteristics of digital information. Attention was 
drawn to these characteristics in the interviews to find how well known these are among the 
informants and whether they are taken into account in sharing decisions on Facebook. A high level of 
knowledge was uncovered for adults and a high to medium level for the young informants. 
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 Adults generally express a familiarity with the two phenomena, and also report to take them into 
consideration when sharing their personal 
information (Figure 23). Data persistence gets a 
particular focus in this group. Young 
participants give a more ambiguous impression 
as to understanding these general concepts of 
exposure. Some do not have sufficient 
understanding of the concepts, and some say 
they do not consider them in their sharing-
decisions (when understood). About one half of 
the young informants say they understand and 
consider these concepts when sharing information about them: 
… I do think a lot about it, if it is possible to completely remove [the information], or if people 
can change, delete or copy it… in the future… when  I apply for a job, it would be no fun if [the 
employer] could simply 'Google' my name and discover… a lot… (#14,Y6F) 
Data virality, especially the wide and rapid spread of photos, was given a particular focus in the group 
of young participants.  
5.2.5.2 Understanding exposure in Facebook Core 
Marketed by the slogan "the more you share, the 
more social it gets", it is not surprising that 
Facebook's default privacy settings are configured 
for a high level of exposure. Users who do not 
change their settings from default values display 
their personal information to a wide audience, 
sometimes unwittingly. Using Facebook's standard 
settings leave information accessible by the 
general public of Facebook users
63
.  
 
Understanding exposure in Facebook Core appeared with medium to high knowledge for the youth 
and more dispersed throughout the scale for adults (Figure 24). The adult group was split between high 
and low knowledge for this area.  
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When introduced to the example of a typical  Facebook user
64
 sharing with default privacy settings, 
most young participants immediately recognize the high level of exposure and potential risks involved.  
Y3K points to some risk factors: 
… if she didn't limit the availability of her profile… they have access to all they need… if… she 
checks into a location…she has a photo of herself… they can easily find out who she is… they 
know how old she is… telephone number… just fragments of the information she is sharing may 
put her at risk (#15:Y3K) 
Among adults, the number recognizing this issue was lower; one half of the adults recognized this as a 
potential problem. The remaining adults were not familiar with the default settings, or the level of 
exposure these settings are configured for. 
 
Facebook offer users a rich set of privacy and security settings. Many informants find these 
challenging to get acquainted to. The large count of settings, spread out on a number of webpages, 
complicates the choice of a suitable combination of options. Issues were also raised as to validating 
how particular options will work out practice. Yet another challenge stems from the frequent changes 
made to the settings (mentioned also in 5.2.1.3). Information about changes and recommendations on 
preventive actions are typically received through Facebook friends. Lacking one, central source of 
advice, the information and tips available is quite random. Advices circulating on Facebook might be 
hoaxes just as well as useful recommendations:  
… there is an abundance of fictitious recommendations, but… if I receive a serious warning… I 
am likely to go in [to my privacy settings] and check; … did I tick that [box]? (#16:A4K) 
Despite the rapid change in the privacy settings, one half of the informants have changed their privacy 
settings only once since they first registered for a Facebook account. 
 
The transitoriness in privacy settings due to alternation between different privacy contexts (chapter 2) 
is a further complicating factor. As much as 2/3 of the informants were not aware of their own privacy 
settings being superseded when sharing information on another user's Facebook wall.  
 
The next paragraphs take a look at issues related to information exposure in a third privacy context: 
the use of applications in Facebook Platform. 
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5.2.5.3 Understanding exposure in Facebook Platform 
Users may have problems recognizing the 
transferal of control between Facebook and the 
different third-party service providers offering 
services through Facebook Platform, and also to 
recognize the situations where they grant third 
parties access to their own, personal information.  
 
As exposure of personal information amplifies 
through the use of third-party applications (chapter 
2), it is interesting to find out if the informants 
understand the transferal of control and how third-party activity increase potential risks for their 
privacy.  
The analysis of informants' understanding of exposure in Facebook Platform revealed a rather 
ambiguous impression: One half of the informants in both groups demonstrated high knowledge in this 
area, the other half spread between medium and low (Figure 25). No significant differences related to 
age groups were uncovered.  
5.2.5.4 Understanding exposure: a review 
In this first round of analysis, the overall impression of participants' Understanding exposure was 
rather ambiguous. The results spread on all three levels of knowledge.  
 
The strongest level of knowledge was found in exposure as a general phenomenon. This area is 
well understood among adults, and less, but still quite good, by the young participants. A medium to 
high knowledge was found for youths in understanding exposure in Facebook Core, yet the 
impression for adults was more ambiguous. Participants in both age groups say they find this area 
complicated. The impression of understanding exposure in Facebook Platform appeared as ambiguous 
for both age groups. This area seemed well understood by 2/3 of the informants. Among that last 1/3, 
issues of increased exposure and potential risks in use of third-party applications seemed less familiar. 
 
In sum, the understanding of exposure in general appeared as weaker among youth than adults; 
exposure in Facebook Core was indicated as a potential problem area, for adults in particular; and 
exposure in Facebook Platform was indicated as a potential problem area for both age groups.  
  
Figure 25: Understanding exposure in Facebook Platform 
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5.2.6 Knowledge – a summary 
Five elements of the preliminary model of privacy literacy were investigated in this first round of 
analysis focusing on KNOWLEDGE measurements. Two knowledge elements were found as strong in  
both groups: Technology skills (self-reported) and Assigning responsibilities. Three elements, 
Knowledge of risks, Notion of information sensitivity, and Understanding of exposure, appeared as 
improvable. 
For Knowledge of risks, the informants' level of risk 
awareness seemed satisfying, whereas the analysis 
of the most and least focused risks uncovered a low 
focus on some risks of current importance, like 
social engineering, coupling, and phishing.  
 
Investigating Notion of information sensitivity 
revealed a room for improvement for all three 
categories of information, yet expressive 
information was particularly poor valued, especially 
as to the risk of security breaches.  
 
 
The analysis of Understanding exposure left an 
ambiguous impression. This area seemed quite 
familiar to one half of the informants; yet other 
participants seemed to have a weaker understanding of exposure. The youth showed a weaker 
understanding of exposure in general than the adults; Facebook Core appeared as a potential problem 
area for adults in particular; and Facebook Platform as a potential problem area for both age groups. 
 
In sum, the analysis of KNOWLEDGE uncovered three knowledge elements as potential problem 
areas for the informants' privacy: Knowledge of risks, Notion of information sensitivity, and 
Understanding exposure (Figure 26). To develop a richer understanding of these potential problem 
areas, they were further investigated from the perspectives of BEHAVIOR (section 5.3) and the user 
EXPERIENCE (section 5.4). 
  
Figure 26: Privacy literacy: Weak and strong areas uncovered 
in analysis of knowledge 
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5.3 Behavior: Information exposure in actual Facebook use 
 This section presents findings from the investigation of some of the decisions informants have 
made in use of their own Facebook account, focusing on the level of exposure of personal information 
that these choices bring about. Three areas of information control were investigated: 1) mechanisms 
for information control between users in 
Facebook Core (friends and non-friends);   
2) mechanisms for information control 
between users and third-parties in Facebook 
Platform; and 3) Facebook mechanisms to 
control information security. 
 
The risks involved in information exposure 
depend on the character and volume of the 
information exposed. Information content is 
not subject to investigation in this study and 
no conclusions related to actual level of risks will be drawn. The analysis concentrates on informants' 
explicit actions to protect personal information, as well as on their authorization of others' access to 
this information. These measures are assumed as relevant indicators of actual exposure.  
 
Figure 27 provides an informal
65
 illustration of informants' use of protection mechanisms to control 
information exposure on Facebook. A medium level of protection was found for mechanisms in 
Facebook Core and a low level of protection was uncovered for the mechanisms in Facebook Platform 
and for use of Facebook security functions. The findings uncovered for Facebook Platform led to a 
reconsideration of one of the knowledge elements investigated in the previous section and also 
revealed significant age differences in exposure of information. These findings are further detailed in 
the following. 
5.3.1 Exposure to other users in Facebook Core  
A wide variety of settings to control information exposure is provided in Facebook Core. Two 
categories of settings were analyzed: settings for Facebook wall (sharing by the user as well as by 
friends) and settings for the user profile data. A third area was looked into as well; the user's policy for 
accepting friend requests, which tells us who gets access to the information once shared.  
                                                          
 
65 this figure is merely illustrative and not based on accurate numbers from analysis. Accurate numbers for each subarea are  
    presented in figures in subsections 5.3.1, 5.3.2, and 5.3.3, respectively 
Figure 27: Protecting information on Facebook (overview) 
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A medium level of exposure was found for Facebook Core. Figure 28 show the results for individual 
settings investigated. Having a look at the numbers, most young participants and a half of the adults 
have restricted
66
 access to their own wall posts. Of those sharing with a wider audience, three share 
with 'friends-of-friends' and three share with 'public'. The latter three are all adults, and two of them 
chose this setting unknowingly, as they misunderstood the functioning of the privacy settings. This 
was done by accident rather than by choice, and was not a reflection of the users' deliberate publishing 
of own information to a wide audience. 
... if you get into the driver's seat and publish
67, you are in control… what is left then, is the 
problem of others writing… about you, or tag you in these… may I call it… undesirable photos 
(#17:A8M) 
This informant expresses an issue related to restricting the information other people share about him on 
Facebook. From the numbers in Figure 28, informants generally keep a higher focus on restricting their 
own wall posts, rather than on this latter 
issue. About 1/3 have restricted access to 
others' posts on their own wall and 2/3 
have restricted access to tagged
68
 posts. 
 
A brief walkthrough of the contact 
information registered on the informants' 
user profiles was made. Disclosure of 
access-enabling information was found 
relatively low. Most participants had 
restricted all elements that were 
reviewed
69
. Two young participants had 
registered their parents' credit card as payment information. Payment information have no privacy 
settings (this element is hidden for other users by default), but may be subject to security breaches, 
though. 
 
On Facebook, your privacy is only as secure as your weakest friend. A considerate policy for 
accepting friend requests can help protecting data against security threats related to other users' actions 
and also in keeping unauthorized others away from personal information. One half of the young 
                                                          
 
66 in this presentation, 'restricted' and 'restrictions' refer to limiting information access to Facebook friends or less 
67 here thought of as actively controlling the content as well as the audience of the information you share about yourself 
68 tagging refers to inserting a link to a person's Facebook profile into a piece of text, or on a photo 
69 these privacy settings for contact information on the user profiles were checked: email address, IM screen name (ID on  
    other social media), address, phone numbers, website, and payment information (credit card) 
Figure 28: Actual exposure: Information control in Facebook Core 
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participants say they have accepted a friend request from a stranger. This is done occasionally only; 
befriending strangers are rare. When receiving a friend request from somebody they do not know, 
most youth say they try to find out who this is (ask the sender in a personal message, ask friends, or 
investigate connections by looking for friends in common with the sender). Most adults say they just 
ignore friend requests from users they do not recognize and none has accepted a stranger as a friend. 
And also, the total count of Facebook friends has consequences for exposure. As seen in the beginning 
of this chapter (Table 5), youths generally have twice the count of Facebook friends as adults, and 
consequently have a higher level of exposure within the network of Facebook friends.  
 
Summing up, the analysis revealed a medium exposure for the informants in Facebook Core. A 
small, but potentially significant age difference in understanding the exposure mechanisms was 
observed, as two adults share their wall posts with the public without recognizing doing this. The 
young participants is slightly more restrictive than adults as to access to information for people outside 
their network of friends, yet have a higher degree of exposure than adults inside this network. 
5.3.2 Exposure to third-parties in Facebook Platform  
Personal information from user profile and wall posts is subject to exposure through the use of 
applications in Facebook Platform. Exposure to third-parties originates from the users' own use of 
applications and also from their Facebook friends' use of applications. 
 
 Each informant's sharing through their own 
application activity was reviewed by walking 
through the list of applications currently authorized 
to access information on their personal account. 
(Figure 29) sums up three levels of exposure, based  
on the count of authorized applications per 
participant. The young informants had a 
significantly higher
70
 count of authorized 
applications compared to adults. Young informants 
had high to medium exposure, whereas the adults 
were found primarily in the low exposure category. Peak application count observed were 197 (youth), 
and the participant with the lowest count had authorized only one third-party application (adult).  
 
None of the informants had chosen to deactivate platform applications in general, a selection in the 
privacy settings that blocks all sharing of information with third-parties from taking place. 
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 average/median 112/121 for youths vs. 22/16 for adults 
Figure 29: Actual exposure: authorizing exposure in Facebook 
Platform (own use of apps) 
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Sharing through friends' application activity are controlled by editing the list of information 
elements available for sharing in the privacy settings for Facebook Platform. 17 elements of personal 
information are included in this list, and the elements can be enabled or disabled separate from each 
other. Most (15 of 17) information elements are enabled for sharing by Facebook default.  To explore 
their sharing of information through friends' 
application activity, this list was reviewed for 
each informant. This walkthrough revealed a high 
degree of exposure through friends for all 
participants except one (Figure 30). This adult, 
particularly experienced with Internet and social 
media and using a considerate information 
protection strategy, had limited the list to two 
information elements; one young informant had 
extended the list by one element; whereas 16 of 18 participants used Facebook's default setting of 15 
elements for sharing of information through their friends' third-party application activity.  
 
In this review of actual exposure to third-parties in Facebook Platform, many participants earned 
new knowledge about exposure. In the light of these observations, a new examination of the 
knowledge element Understanding exposure seemed relevant. The next paragraph pays a revisit to the 
informants understanding of exposure in Facebook Platform. 
5.3.2.1 Understanding exposure in Facebook Platform - revisited 
Informants' actual exposure of information in Facebook Platform was high; higher than most 
participants assumed ahead of the review. The review uncovered a distinct lack of knowledge. More 
than one half of the participants discovered 
unanticipated aspects of exposure related to their 
own use of applications, and more than 2/3 was 
caught by surprise by the high level of exposure 
originating from their friends' application activity.  
 
Adjusting the image of Understanding exposure in 
Facebook Platform from the first round of analysis 
(Figure 25) according to this lack of knowledge 
changed the impression remarkably (Figure 31). The 
image now shows a low to medium level of knowledge for a majority of informants.  
 
Figure 31: Understanding exposure in Facebook Platform - 
revisited 
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Most informants were unaware of central aspects of their exposure of information in Facebook 
Platform. Some were surprised by the fact that they were using third-party applications at all and 
others were surprised by the total count of applications authorized for their account. Some were 
surprised to find that information is exposed through friends' use of applications in the first place and 
others were surprised by discovering the volume and content of this exposure as such. How this 
situation be explained? Responses pointed to several explanations:  
 
First, the authorization process for third-party applications can be difficult to understand. Some 
find it difficult to accept authorization requests as the consequences of accepting are poorly explained. 
Some understand the authorization process as a standard procedure; read one, and you have read them 
all. Still others think that the privacy settings for Facebook Core are overriding the authorizations for 
third-parties. Mistakes like these can lead users to authorize applications unwittingly or to authorize 
applications without understanding the consequences of doing this. When introduced to an 
authorization page asking for extensive rights to access information one of the adults describes a 
feeling of uncertainty evoked by this request:  
…I do not accept requests like this… because I do not know what it is. I may have done 
that…unwittingly at times… [the thought of accepting this]makes me feel unsure, so I do not do 
that (#18:A6M) 
This informant expresses how the feeling of uncertainty makes him reject the request. This is not the 
case for all participants. Uncertainty related to the authorization process was commonly described, but 
accepting or rejecting the application when facing this uncertainty seemed to vary. An 'accept and 
forget'-strategy to handle the uncertainty was mentioned by several informants. 
 
Secondly, the acceptance of an application can be based the faulty assumption that Facebook is 
offering it or vouching for it: 
… I think many people trust this… as long as [the application] is under the Facebook logo… 
they accept…The first really mean app has… not yet arrived… but might as well come… and let 
millions of users install Trojans… (#19:A8M) 
This dislocation of trust from Facebook to third-party service providers may stem from the standard 
Facebook layout often used in the authorization process interface. This potentially makes the transition 
from one service provider to another less noticeable for users. In the transcript above, the informant 
also focuses on how the extensive acceptance of third-party applications among users in general 
potentially opens the door for malicious software. In the latter case, Facebook's intention of 'utilizing 
community' in their vision of the Social Graph would re-emerge with the signs reversed. 
 
70 
 
A third aspect relates to the need to recall authorizations for applications no longer in use. Many 
informants seem to miss out on the fact that authorizations granted to third-parties yield until they are 
explicitly recalled. In the application list, a mark is shown on those not in use in the last six months: 
@@ I didn't have a clue that I had [authorized] this many @@ … it is more than six months 
ago…yes… @ … most of them, actually (#20:Y5K) 
Among youths particularly, significant differences were observed between the count of applications 
authorized and the count of applications in current use. The most pronounced discrepancy observed 
was 197 applications authorized vs. 2 applications in use in the last six months.  
 
A fourth and last aspect relates to the informants' familiarity with Facebook's privacy settings for 
Facebook Platform. Few gave the impression of visiting the administration page for third-party 
applications on a regular basis. In addition, most participants were unfamiliar with the dedicated page 
for controlling the information exposure through friends' third-party activity. 
5.3.3 Protecting information by Facebook's security functions 
Use of Facebook security functions was reviewed in the analysis, as well. The results show that 
most participants do not use these options to protect the information on their Facebook account. The 
use of three different settings was examined:                 
1) Browsing Facebook on a secure 
connection (HTTPS), 2) Using email/SMS  
notifications when an unknown browser is 
used for logging into the account (login 
notifications),  and 3) Using a security code 
when an unknown browser is used for 
logging into the account (two-step login 
verifications). 
 
 Figure 32 shows that four informants used a 
secure connection and one participant had login notifications activated. Otherwise, the security 
functions were not in use.  
 
Informants were further asked if they use one password for logging into Facebook exclusively. 
More than 2/3 of the participants reuse their Facebook password on other services on the Internet.   
  
Figure 32: Actual exposure: Information control by Facebook security 
functions 
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5.3.4 Behavior – a summary 
The analysis revealed medium exposure for informants in Facebook Core. Adults are slightly more 
visible outside their network of Facebook friends, whereas young participants expose themselves to a 
larger audience within this network. A small, but potentially significant age difference in disfavor of 
the adults was identified related to the exposure of own wall posts.  
 
Exposure to third parties seems as a particularly complicated area. The review of settings for 
informants' own use of applications in Facebook Platform uncovered a high to medium volume of 
applications authorized for young informants and a low to medium volume for adults. Except one 
adult, exposure in sharing through friends' application activity was high for both groups.  
 
Most participants gained new knowledge in the 
walkthrough of their privacy settings for third-
party applications. Uncertainties associated with 
the authorization process as well as a dislocation 
of trust from Facebook to third-party service 
providers, may lead to unintentional granting of 
access rights to third-party applications. Another 
aspect relates to the low focus on recalling 
authorizations for applications no longer in use. 
 
Many informants were unfamiliar with the privacy 
settings for Facebook Platform. This indicates that 
the self-reports for Facebook privacy settings 
(section 5.2) was too optimistic, at least with 
regard to the settings for Facebook Platform. The measurement of KNOWLEDGE related to 
Understanding exposure (section 5.2) indicated Facebook Platform as a potential problem area. In the 
cross-checking to actual behavior described in this section, this finding was strengthened and 
confirmed. The revisit uncovered insufficient (low or medium) knowledge by 15/18 informants, as 
compared to 8/18 in the first round of analysis. Based on this, the assessment of the knowledge 
element Understanding exposure in the model showing weak and strong areas of privacy literacy is 
changed from improvable to weak. The change is shown in Figure 33. 
 
A review of the use of Facebook security functions showed that most participants do not use these 
options offered by Facebook to protect the information on their Facebook account. More than 2/3 on 
the informants reuse their Facebook password on other web services.  
  
Figure 33: Privacy literacy: Weak and strong areas 
reconsidered by behavior 
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5.4 Experiences of privacy on Facebook 
This part of the presentation focuses on the informants' overall EXPERIENCE of privacy, by 
looking into the 'constant stream of self-talk that happens when they interact with' Facebook 
('experience', Forlizzi & Battarbee, 2004, p 263).  
 
Two features potentially important for the informants' privacy were uncovered in analysis; a basic 
sense of security and an experience of low vulnerability. Figure 34 presents an image of the general 
privacy experience by combining the impressions of these two features, picturing users perceiving 
themselves as rarely or occasionally exposed to risks on Facebook.  
 
 The two features of the privacy 
experience are described in the 
following: subsection 5.4.1 describes the 
basic sense of security and control, and 
subsection 5.4.2 details some aspects of 
vulnerability, the participants' notion of 
low sensitivity for own, personal 
information in particular.  
 
Subsection 5.4.3 questions the fragility 
of the general privacy experience, as the 
concrete experiences ('an experience', Forlizzi & Battarbee, 2004) many participants had when 
participation in this study might come to 'inspire behavioral and emotional change' in a longer run 
(2004, p. 263). Subsection 5.4.4 reviews the findings related to experience.  
 
This analysis suggests the introduction of one additional knowledge element in the privacy literacy 
model developed in the previous sections: Managing vulnerability. It also led to a reconsideration of 
the analysis of the knowledge element Notion of information sensitivity presented in section 5.2. 
 
5.4.1 A basic sense of security 
A basic sense of security and a feeling of being in control of their own privacy were running as a 
recurring theme in the interviews for both age groups. The sense of security was stronger among the 
youths than in the group of adults (Figure 35).  And the high-quality exercise of one (or few) preferred 
information protection strategy(-ies) appeared as an essential basis for this security experience. 
 
The most important information protection strategy applied is the careful selection of information 
for sharing: 16 participants emphasize such self-censorship as a main strategy (Figure 36).  
  
Figure 34: Experiencing vulnerability on Facebook (overview) 
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A feeling of control was commonly associated to the practice of self-censorship: 
… this is certainly something I know about my own publishing, or presence as a person on the 
Internet,… I am [in control of] the staging now… what I give access to, I know this is of a non-
sensitive character… This is indeed… fundamental to my understanding:  what I… put out 
there… are things that I do not have any problems to share (#21:A8M) 
A two-fold purpose for self-censorship was found 
among informants: personal presentation on one 
hand and protecting information against misuse 
on the other. Adults' self-censorship had a general 
turn against self-presentation and the shaping of 
an online identity. Self-censorship was commonly 
characterized by terms like 'staging' and 'playing 
a role': 
 
… I have this role to play… I am a public person on Facebook… on Facebook, I am <her 
workplace position>… and at all times, I am answerable for everything in there (#22:A1F) 
Many adults talked about self-censorship as the shaping of information for public presentation; some 
having public presentation as an aim in itself, others focusing on preventing potential embarrassment 
in case their Facebook information of some reason become publicly available in the future This focus 
was different among youths, more commonly focusing on protection strategies to restrict information 
access to their network of Facebook friends only.  
The pronounced focus on identity and personal 
integrity among adults was replaced by a similar 
focus on security issues among the youths. Young 
informants expressed a strong focus on protecting 
personal data against misuse; to avoid threats to 
their personal, physical security (stalking, abuse) 
and identity thefts, in particular.  Computer 
security (hacking, password security) and fraud 
were emphasized, as well. 
 
… my address… they probably could have used this to pay me a visit, or do something to me 
’face-to-face'… or… they could…  steal my identity and try to pass themselves off as me           
(#23:Y4M) 
Figure 36: Main strategies for protection of information 
Figure 35: The basic experience of security and control 
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When asked about their main protection strategy, one half of the youth informants say they depend on 
a combined strategy to secure the information on their Facebook account; self-censorship combined 
with the use of privacy settings (Figure 36): 
I have made sure that if complete strangers search for my name, they are allowed to see my 
profile picture and nothing else. They cannot get into my personal profile (#24:Y9F) 
One adult explicitly mentioned the use of privacy settings as a supplementary protection strategy, 
about one half of the adults considered self-censorship as sufficient in its own right: 
I guess my settings are quite open, but my strategy is not putting too personal information out 
there (#25:A3M) 
In addition to the main information protection strategy, two other aspects of experience appeared as 
important for the basic sense of security; trust and a primary audience view. These are visited briefly 
in the next two paragraphs.  
5.4.1.1 Supporting decision-making by a primary audience view 
Many users have a high count of Facebook friends, and visualizing them all when sharing would be 
problematic. Some reduce complexity in privacy decisions by focusing on a subset of friends: 
… when sharing, I do not think about this friend… I met once… several years ago…  I think 
of… my closest friends… the friends who give me updates on my posts (#26:Y9F) 
Most participants recognize the idea of a primary 
audience
71
 as a subset of their total collection of 
Facebook friends (Table 12). About 2/3 estimated the 
size of this subset, and the table presents the results 
of seeing these estimates
72
 as a factor of the total 
number of friends. As usually sharing their posts 
with 'friends' (or more), the informants are focusing 
on a primary audience that is significantly lower than 
their actual audience when sharing. The primary 
audience is generally described as the people they 
interact with the most, online or in the physical 
                                                          
 
71 primary audience refer to the selection (usually a subset) of Facebook friends envisioned by a user when sharing 
72 most informants estimated the size of the primary audience by  a range of numbers. When calculating primary audiences'  
    share of total Facebook friends, the largest number in the range was always used 
   
Primary audience Teens Adults 
Recognize the idea of a primary 
audience 
8/9 7/9 
Less than 10% of Facebook 
friends  
5 1 
From 10 to 20% of Facebook 
friends  
1 2 
From 20 to 30% of Facebook 
friends  
1 1 
Consider all Facebook friends as 
audience when sharing  
1 2 
Recognize the idea, but find it 
difficult to quantify 
1 3 
Table 12: Primary audience 
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world. Three informants say they do not find it meaningful to talk about a primary audience, as they 
focus on their complete network when sharing. 
5.4.1.2 Supporting decision-making by trust 
Another aspect potentially reducing complexity in 
privacy decisions is trust. Expressions of trust 
appeared in a variety of contexts in the interviews. A 
full-scale analysis of trust in the empirical material is 
not within scope for the study, but as a recurrently 
mentioned matter, a very brief presentation of the 
contexts in which the question of trust most 
commonly appeared in, is worthwhile. Table 13 gives 
an overview of these contexts. 
 
 
5.4.2 A feeling of invulnerability 
Another characteristic feature of the privacy experience is the feeling of invulnerability towards 
privacy risks that color the interaction. Two explicit expressions of this experience are the perception 
of own insignificance in the perspective of a potential perpetrator and the notion of low sensitivity for 
own, personal information. 
5.4.2.1 Insignificant in the perspective of the perpetrator 
Most (15/18) informants found it unlikely to be interesting as a potential target for a perpetrator 
(Figure 37). A general reason is associated to anonymity and to the fact that there are hundreds of 
millions of user accounts on the Facebook service: 
… I am not sure if anybody… who would bother to get anything from my account? Well, I don't 
know, but I think like this. We are anonymous in the crowd in there (#27:A3M) 
Some other reasons were generally made with a 
touch of humor: 'I am too boring', '…not wealthy 
enough', '…not famous enough', or 'I am too old' 
 
However, strongly accentuated in both age groups 
was the conception of own information as of low 
sensitivity for misuse. The next paragraph 
reviews some characteristics of this view. 
 
Experiences of trust Teens Adults 
Likely to accept a third-party app 
if accepted by friends 
* * 
Likely to accept a friend request if 
accepted by friends 
* * 
Trust in friends' confidentiality 
important for sharing decisions 
* * 
Share Facebook password with 
trusted others 
* * 
Likely to take precautions when 
recommended by friends 
* * 
Likely to accept a third-party app 
from a trusted source 
* * 
Table 13: Experiences of trust 
Figure 37: Views of self as a potential target for a perpetrator 
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5.4.2.2 Notion of information sensitivity - revisited   
Many informants considered their own information as rather invulnerable for misuse. 10 
informants rated their own information's sensitivity as low, five as medium, and three rated this as high 
(Figure 38):   
… I am not that interesting… what I… make available on Facebook is … rather ordinary 
information of no particular interest… there are photos and situations which may be 
entertaining… except this, it has… no further potential (#28:A6M) 
Self-censorship was stressed as the major reason for this low sensitivity: 
… I ask the question 'are there any data at all on Facebook that may be subject to misuse? … it 
is this matter of staging, again. I do not keep anything on Facebook… that is not in the white 
pages, or yellow pages, or wherever… and photos that may be compromising, of course, I don't 
have any of those… (#29:A8M) 
The careful selection of information strengthens a feeling of control, and privacy decisions feel less 
complex:  
… I cannot imagine myself as interesting, even if… I have to admit… I have a very open 
Facebook profile… this is precisely because I think  '… nobody… nobody is able to [mis-] use 
this…' (#30:A8M) 
The informants were asked how they would think and feel if their Facebook password fell into the 
hands of unauthorized others. Responses strengthened the impression of low sensitivity for own 
information, as this situation was described as uncomfortable, but harmless. A few concerns for 
integrity issues related to exposure of personal 
messages were expressed, yet no concerns for 
information security were brought up.  
 
Another expression of low sensitivity relates to 
exposure in Facebook Platform; 1/3 of the 
participants say they were likely to accept the 
third-party application asking for extensive rights 
to access personal information, even if they were 
aware of the risks associated to this choice. 
 
In sum, various expressions for low sensitivity were expressed in the interviews. Own information 
was rated lower than any of the specific information categories considered earlier (section 5.2). This 
was reflected in the model for weak and strong areas of privacy literacy by changing the knowledge 
Figure 38: Notion of information sensitivity: own information 
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element Notion of information sensitivity from improvable to weak. The updated model is presented in 
the review at the end of this section (Figure 39). 
5.4.3 A fragile experience? 
The image of security and invulnerability apparent from the previous paragraphs has more colors, 
though. Expressions of uncertainty and insecurity were observed in the interviews as well. However, 
these expressions were more toned down, and commonly quite vaguely described. In strength, they 
were undoubtedly subordinated the expressions of feeling secure and invulnerable. Among others, an 
abstractly described feeling of possessing insufficient knowledge of privacy came up several times:  
I would like to think that I am quite skilled, but I am perfectly sure there are a lot of things we 
quite simply don't know of… things that we don't have enough knowledge of (#31:A2F) 
Contributing in this study turned out as a reality check for many of its participants. Looking this 
thoroughly towards privacy and security, and reviewing aspects of their own Facebook practice in 
particular, invited reflections and gave new insights. For the walkthrough of exposure in third-party 
applications (section 5.3), this was particularly striking. One of the youths describes how this review 
made her realize a lack of control: 
… this shows how little control I actually have… I thought I was in control of this… [these 
settings] are spread out… [Realizing] this was like ’wow!’…. (#32:Y9F) 
10 informants expressed emotional reactions to the inconsistencies between anticipations and reality 
that was uncovered for 14 out of 18 participants. The following transcripts reflect some typical 
emotions of humor and unpleasant surprise that came up in the review of third-party settings: 
@@ hahaha @@@... @@@ nohohoho @@ Wow! @@ … @@ I didn't have the vaguest idea 
that it was this many @@ (#33:Y5F) 
Wow! I have never used those! I will get rid of the whole lot… None of them… I have never used 
those! (#34:A2F) 
Oh, I use… wow!...how do I delete…? … this must be a joke!... and I thought that I was not a 
part of this… @@... good grief! @@ Okey… this will be… now I will become much more 
aware (#35:A6M) 
Many participants said that the study was raising their awareness to the issues involved. At the same 
time, though, the self-examination implied was adding to the feeling of uncertainty. Participation was 
described not only as interesting and informative, yet as evoking an uncomfortable feeling of 
uncertainty and insecurity as well. In transcript #34, the informant expresses how the experience is 
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likely to change his choices in the future. And another informant describes how she finds herself more 
aware of privacy issues after the strong focus kept on this topic in the interview:  
… these things are important, for sure… why haven't I… been more focused [earlier]… I think 
like this now, when we have gone through it all … (#36:A9F)  
The review showed that no informant had opted to deactivate platform applications function (5.3.2). 
In the review, however, several adult participants wanted to activate this setting immediately. 
 
In sum, the reality check involved in the concrete experiences of the interview situation may 
influence the participants' general experience of privacy on Facebook in the longer run. The new 
insights gained might come to 'inspire emotional and behavioral change' in the future. 
5.4.4 The user experience – a summary 
The participants overall experience of privacy on Facebook is characterized of a basic sense of 
security and control. This was found a little stronger among the youths than in the group of adults.  
 
Most participants use self-censorship as their main strategy for information protection. Among the 
young informants it is quite common to use a combined strategy, where they include the use of privacy 
settings for protection as well. Adults focus their 
self-censorship primarily on the potential 
consequences for identity and personal integrity, 
whereas youths keep a higher focus on security 
issues and the protection of information against 
misuse. Adults further envision the possibility of 
shared information being publicly available in the 
future, whereas youths potentially aim at the 
creation of a personal space online. In addition to 
the focus on a main information protection 
strategy, trust and a primary audience view 
potentially strengthen the fundamental sense of 
security among informants, as well. 
 
Looking into the participants' perceptions of themselves in the perspective of a perpetrator, as well as 
their notion of information sensitivity for own, personal information, suggested a low to medium 
degree of vulnerability experienced among informants. Their views of their own information called for 
a downgrade of the knowledge element Notion of information sensitivity from improvable to weak. This 
change is reflected in the final version of the model of weak and strong areas of privacy literacy 
(Figure 39).  
Figure 39: Privacy literacy: Weak and strong areas 
reconsidered by experiences 
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The informants' secure experience to some extent contrasts their actual privacy situation on 
Facebook, which is characterized by a high level of exposure to the 'silent listeners' and a medium 
level of exposure to other users (section 5.3). It also contrasts the general privacy situation for social 
media use (chapter 2), as well as elements of privacy knowledge revealed in section 5.2, like 
Knowledge of risks and Notion of information sensitivity. To the extent that privacy decisions are 
influenced by their security experience, these decisions may turn out as inadequate to protect privacy. 
 
 In order to reflect the knowledge stemming from this EXPERIENCE and the potential influence of 
this on privacy related BEHAVIOR, a separate knowledge element in the model of privacy literacy is 
suggested; Managing vulnerability (Figure 39). This element captures the recognition of vulnerability, 
choice of an information protection strategy, as well as the goals and time perspective related to the 
exercise of this strategy. Further investigation will be needed to explore the actual effects of this 
element on privacy behavior. 
 
Finally, the fragility of the general experience ('experience') was questioned, as the concrete 
experience ('an experience') of participating in this study seemed to add to the informants' vague and 
not very pronounced feeling of uncertainty and insecurity. This concrete experience may come to 
change the general experience of some participants and perhaps their decisions related to privacy on 
Facebook, in a longer run. 
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5.5 A review of findings 
Based on the preliminary model presented in Figure 11, elements of the informants' privacy literacy 
have been investigated from three perspectives in this study; 1) by mapping out the informants' 
knowledge directly by self-reports and measuring; 2) by comparing and cross-checking some of these 
findings to informants' behavior in the form of privacy decisions in actual Facebook use; and 3) by 
investigating the informants' privacy-related user experiences, which frame the practical application of 
their privacy knowledge.  
 
The first round of analysis focused on measuring of the informants' KNOWLEDGE. Three knowledge 
elements from the preliminary model, Knowledge of risks, Notion of information sensitivity, and 
Understanding exposure, were found as improvable (Figure 26). Ambiguous results for Understanding 
Exposure in particular, pointed this out as a potential problem area.  
 
The analysis of knowledge uncovered some valuable details, like the tables of most focused threats 
(Table 8) and least focused threats (Table 9), reflecting a low focus on current threats like social 
engineering and coupling. And also the notion of expressive information as the least sensitive 
information type may increase users' vulnerability to these threats in particular. The views of most and 
least focused threats were common for the age groups. The two elements Technology skills and 
Assigning responsibilities were found strong for both groups 
 
 
In the subsequent look into the informants' BEHAVIOR in some areas of Facebook use, several 
indications of a potential relationship between knowledge and behavior were observed. The 
impression of all three aspects of Understanding exposure as potential problem areas was confirmed 
and strengthened in this cross-checking of knowledge to actual behavior. A downgrade of the 
knowledge element from improvable to weak (Figure 33) resulted from this cross-check. 
 
The actual exposure of personal information to third-parties in Facebook Platform was found as 
high. The actual exposure through functions in Facebook Core was found s medium. In Facebook 
Platform, the young informants had significantly higher exposure than the adults through their own use 
of third party applications (Figure 29), whereas both groups had high exposure through their friends' 
use of applications (Figure 30). Informants generally did not use the security functions provided by 
Facebook to protect their information (Figure 32).  
 
Investigating the informants' behavioral choices further confirmed the rather low focus on 
expressive information and threats like social engineering and coupling found in the investigation of 
KNOWLEDGE, previously. 
 
 
 
81 
 
Analyzing the informants' EXPERIENCE of their interaction with Facebook gave further information 
about their privacy literacy. This analysis uncovered two distinctive features of the informants' general 
privacy experiences; a basic sense of security and a feeling of invulnerability. This experience diverge 
from their actual privacy situation on Facebook and to the extent that it influences their privacy 
decisions, it may come to influence their privacy decisions negatively.  
 
Analyzing experience uncovered differences between the age groups related to the choice of 
information protection strategies, goals, and timeframe for the privacy process. Youths tend to focus 
on security issues and the building of a personal space for communication on Facebook. Most of them 
point to the use of Facebook's privacy settings as a main strategy for protection of information and one 
half of them use self-censorship in combination with privacy settings. Adults generally focus on 
identity and self-presentation online with the purpose of sharing information appropriate for the 
potential, yet not necessarily intended, public availability of information in the future. Summarized, 
self-censorship, self-presentation and potential publicity in a long-term perspective commonly 
characterize the adults' perspectives, whereas privacy settings, data protection, privacy, and 
immediacy are keywords typical for the youths' privacy process. 
 
As a result of the analysis of EXPERIENCE a sixth knowledge element was added to the model of 
privacy literacy; Managing vulnerability. And as this analysis further found the informants' view of 
low sensitivity for own information as strengthening and expanding the impression of knowledge from 
the first round of analysis, the knowledge element Notion of information sensitivity was downgraded 
from improvable to weak (Figure 39).  
 
Highlights from the data analysis are illustrated in Figure 39 and summarized in Table 14 on the next 
page. 
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73 impr. = impression 
74 the + sign indicate that the measure observed for this group was in the higher end of the scale 
75 hyphen = no general age difference can be stated 
76 some risks are less focused (among these social engineering, coupling) 
77 youths show a higher focus on SI and AI than adults. For views of sensitivity for own, personal information no significant 
age differences were observed 
78 adults have a better understanding of exposure in general and give the impression of applying this knowledge in interaction 
79 the experience is not subject to measurement, and in this case, weak reflects that the experiences was diverging from the  
    actual privacy situation of the informants 
80 n/a = not applicable 
81 as opposed to adults, half of the youths depend on a combined data protection strategy 
 Knowledge 
element 
Overall 
impr.
73
 
Overall age 
diff. 
Area Impr. Age 
diff. 
Knowledge Technology skills  
(self-reported) Strong Youth +74 
PC and Internet use High -75 
Facebook use High - 
Facebook settings High/Med Youth + 
Assigning 
responsibilities 
Strong - 
 
High - 
Knowledge of 
risks Improvable - 
Self-reported knowledge High/Med Youth + 
Ind risk awareness profiles High/Med - 
Risk scenario Medium76 - 
Notion of 
information 
sensitivity 
Weak (Youth +)77 
Self-identifying info. High/Med Youth + 
Access-enabling info. Med/High Youth + 
Expressive info. Med/Low Adults + 
Understanding 
exposure Weak (Adults +)78 
In general High/Med Adults + 
In Facebook Core Med/High Youth + 
In Facebook Platform Low/Med. - 
Behavior Actual exposure  
Med/High Youth + 
Exposure FB Core Medium - 
on Facebook Exposure FB Platform High Youth + 
 Exposure in FB Security High - 
Experience A basic sense of 
security 
Weak79 n/a80 
Based on a preferred protection 
strategy81 
 
n/a 
Low vulnerability Based on low value for own info n/a n/a 
A fragile exp.? Reality check inspires changes in 
behavior? 
 
n/a 
Table 14: Data analysis: a review of findings 
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6. DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, findings are discussed in light of the four research questions. Section 6.1 looks at 
the relevance of privacy knowledge for non-secure behavior (Q1). Section 6.2 discusses the interplay 
between privacy experiences and privacy behavior in explanations of non-secure behavior (Q2). 
Section 6.3 describes the weak and strong areas of privacy literacy uncovered (Q3), and section 6.4 
reviews the differences in privacy literacy observed between the age groups (Q4). Section 6.5 reflects 
on the importance of the theoretical contributions for the research process, and points out some 
particularly supportive concepts: emotions, time, negotiations, and identity.  
Section 6.6 finalizes this chapter by presenting an evaluation of the study; discussing aspects 
relevant for its scientific quality and the role of theory in the research process. 
6.1 The relation between knowledge and non-secure behavior 
RQ1: Can inadequate knowledge of privacy explain why users sometimes show non-secure behavior 
on Facebook? 
Several findings indicate privacy knowledge as important for behavior. The most significant 
indication is associated to informants' understanding of their information exposure to third-parties 
(exposure in Facebook Platform), where measures of knowledge indicated a potential problem area 
(5.2.5.3). The cross-check of knowledge to actual behavior confirmed this impression; actual exposure 
to third-parties was found as high (5.3.2). Age differences were observed in this area, these are 
reviewed in the discussion of RQ4. 
 
A similar relationship is suggested for information exposure through the core functionality on 
Facebook (exposure in Facebook Core). This was indicated as a potential problem area by the 
measures of knowledge (5.2.5.1), and the cross-check to actual behavior (5.3.2) confirmed this 
impression. A medium level of exposure was observed for Facebook Core. 
 
On the individual level, the relationship between knowledge and behavior was strengthened by the 
two informants misunderstanding the privacy settings, resulting in a higher level of exposure than 
intended. This problem was indicated by several knowledge measures for these informants: their 
understanding of information exposure through Facebook core functionality (understanding exposure 
in Facebook Core) was rated as Low for both; and in their self-reports for knowledge of Facebook 
privacy settings, both rated this knowledge by the medium level value good. The latter value is in the 
lower end of the scale actually applied by informants for self-reports. Another individual level 
example indicating a relation between knowledge and behavior is the case that only one participant 
was protecting her personal information against sharing by friends' use of third-party applications. 
This informant rated her knowledge of Facebook privacy settings as pretty good, and her 
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understanding of exposure of information to third parties (understanding exposure in Facebook 
Platform) was measured as high. 
 
A relation between knowledge and behavior was indicated in two other knowledge areas, as well, 
more indirectly than the above. Informants generally expressed a restrictive attitude towards 
registering self-identifying and access-enabling information, but similar considerations were not 
exhibited for expressive information (Notion of information sensitivity, 5.2.4.3). This pattern was 
recognized in the review of their actual information sharing on Facebook, and indicates a relation 
between knowledge and behavior. More indirectly, it can be interpreted as a relationship between 
actual exposure and the low focus on threats like social engineering and coupling revealed in 
Knowledge of risks (5.2.3.4), as well. Expressive information has the potential of providing extra 
power to attempts of imposing these threats upon others (2.1.2) 
 
However, finding that  informants in general do not employ the security functions provided by 
Facebook (5.3.3) does not support an explanation of non-secure behavior by level of knowledge, as the 
focus on security issues was quite pronounced, particularly among youths. This lack of rationality may 
be interpreted as a result of the informants' experiences of privacy in their Facebook interactions, a 
matter which is discussed for RQ2, below. 
 
CONCLUSION: Findings suggest that privacy knowledge can explain why users sometimes show non-
secure behavior on Facebook. This is indicated by three areas of knowledge identified as weak or 
improvable in the model of privacy literacy: users' understanding of information exposure 
(Understanding exposure), users' understanding of and awareness to risks (Knowledge of risks), and 
their conceptions of sensitivity for misuse related to different categories of information; expressive 
information in particular (Notion of information sensitivity). The most significant indicator was 
Understanding Exposure. 
6.2 The interplay between knowledge and user experiences 
RQ2: Do users' experiences of privacy on Facebook complement the rational, fact-based knowledge 
aspects of their privacy literacy? 
Findings suggest that privacy experiences can complement the rational fact-based knowledge 
aspects of users' privacy literacy in two ways; by explaining a lack of rationality in some of their 
privacy decisions and by improving and strengthening the impressions from knowledge 
measurements.  
The informants' experience of security and low vulnerability may explain the lack of rationality in 
most users' decisions of not employing Facebook security functions, despite the awareness of security 
risks expressed in the measures for conceptions of information sensitivity for self-identifying and 
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access-enabling information, among youths in particular (Notion of information sensitivity, 5.2.4.1, 
5.2.4.2). This assumption of user experiences as influencing actual behavior cannot be confirmed, 
however, several aspects point in this direction. The question of user experiences influence on actual 
behavior is further discussed below. 
The investigation of users' experiences also improved and strengthened the impression of 
knowledge found by measuring knowledge in previous analyses. This is indicated in the changed 
impression of knowledge described in the revisit to their Notion of information sensitivity (5.4.2.2), 
where the experience complemented and strengthened the impression of low sensitivity for expressive 
information (5.2.4.3), and also revealed that informants generally find their own information as of low 
vulnerability for misuse. It is further indicated by the emotional reactions and reflections appearing 
when reviewing their information exposure to third-parties, which strengthened the impression of non-
secure behavior as related to a lack of knowledge in this area (understanding exposure in Facebook 
Platform, 5.2.5.3 and 5.3.2.1). 
 
The assumption that user experiences influence actual behavior is based on the interpretation that 
protection feels less important for informants who are experiencing themselves as rarely exposed to 
threats (section 5.4). To confirm such assumption, a more thorough investigation of the privacy 
decision process would be required. However, previous research has found a relation between 
experiential aspects and privacy behavior (section 2.3). And other findings from this study point to 
experience as a potentially important factor for privacy behavior, as well. For example, the feeling of 
uncertainty in the authorization process for third-parties appeared as influencing the informants' 
privacy decisions (5.3.2.1); trust in others was denoted as simplifying the privacy decisions (5.4.1.2); 
as was the experience of a primary audience (5.4.1.1). And further, the reactions in
82
 and after
83
 the 
review of exposure to third parties demonstrated the potential influence of concrete experiences ( 'an 
experience') on behavior and knowledge. 
 
A competing explanation for the problem of most users not employing Facebook security functions 
could be related to Facebook design and users having trouble with recognizing the security settings. 
Accessing these settings require users to navigate between different web pages (associated to two 
separate main menus: privacy settings menu vs. account settings menu
84
). The splitting of settings on 
many pages may make these less apparent to users. 
 
                                                          
 
82 informants wanted to deactivate Facebook Platform functions immediately (5.4.3) 
83 informants expected a change of behavior in the future (5.4.3) 
84 this interface has been changed and looks different today than at the time of data collection 
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This study has shown that the informants' secure experience of privacy on Facebook contrasts their 
actual privacy situation, which is characterized by a medium to high level of information exposure 
(section 5.3) in a context of many privacy threats (chapter 2). To the degree that user' privacy 
decisions are influenced by this secure experience, these may turn out as inadequate to protect their 
information.  
 
To reflect the findings related to experience, a new knowledge element was introduced to the 
model of privacy literacy: Managing vulnerability (5.4.4). This knowledge element represents the 
knowledge coming from the vulnerability experience and captures, recognition of vulnerability, 
chosen information protection strategy, as well as the goals and time perspective related to this 
strategy. 
 
CONCLUSION: Investigating privacy decisions from several perspectives (KNOWLEDGE, BEHAVIOR, 
and EXPERIENCE) provided more rich insights into the informants' behavior in privacy related 
situations. Findings suggest that privacy experiences can complement the rational fact-based 
knowledge aspects of users' privacy literacy in two ways; by explaining a lack of rationality in some of 
their privacy decisions, and by improving and strengthening the impressions from knowledge 
measurements. Further investigations of the decision process are recommended to understand the 
influence of experience on behavior in detail. 
6.3 Weak and strong areas of privacy literacy 
RQ3: Are some areas of the users' privacy literacy identified as weaker than others, in this way as 
candidates for improvement? 
The findings reflect that informants generally recognize themselves as the main responsible for 
protecting the information shared online. Their general technology skills were reported as strong; this 
impression was not weakened in the interviews. As previous research has shown problems in the use 
of self-reported privacy knowledge (chapter 2), a more thorough investigation of technology skills 
potentially give other results. Such investigations have not been within the scope of this work, though. 
 
As this study is aimed at explaining non-secure behavior by a low level of privacy knowledge, the 
most interesting findings for this study are related to the weak and improvable areas of literacy.  
 
Informants in both age groups are potentially vulnerable for  misuse of information due to features 
of the experience that characterize their interactions with Facebook  (Managing vulnerability, 5.4); by 
the basic sense of security; by the conception of low sensitivity of own personal information; and by 
employing a limited number of main strategies for protection of information.  
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The privacy experience of the young informants was characterized by a relatively short timeframe 
and an aim at creating a personal space online. These aspects potentially increase vulnerability, as 
digital information tends to be long-lived and the risks for misuse are numerous, despite the youths' 
regulation of information control by Facebook privacy settings. Adults expressed a more long-term 
perspective for their privacy decisions, but base their sharing on a rather public policy. Sharing 
publicly, combined with a lack of knowledge of certain risks (Knowledge of risks, 5.2.3) may put 
adults at risk, unwittingly. 
 
The informants' risk awareness was observed as relatively strong, but a low focus on current threats 
like social engineering and coupling potentially increases their vulnerability (Knowledge of risks, 
5.2.3.4). This impression is strengthened by the low recognition of the need to protect expressive 
information (e.g. preferences, 'likes', and interests) against misuse. Expressive information was 
commonly not recognized as valuable in the hands of a perpetrator (Notion of information sensitivity, 
5.2.4.3). 
 
The extensive sharing of personal information with 'silent listeners' through the use of third-party 
applications came as a surprise on a significant number of informants (exposure in Facebook Platform, 
5.3.2).  This is intriguing, in light of the excessive use of third-party applications typical for today's 
technology use (chapter 2). An insufficient recognition of the volume of third-party exposure, 
problems related to the authorization process for third-parties, as well as a lack of understanding of 
Facebook's privacy settings for sharing with third-parties (understanding exposure in Facebook 
Platform, 5.3.2.1) was observed. The interviews revealed weak knowledge as an important explanation 
for the extensive sharing in this area (Understanding exposure in Facebook Platform, 5.3.2.1), but also 
the user experience, by the trade-off usefulness/pleasure versus protection in the authorization process 
for third party applications, may be important for this situation. This matter is further discussed for 
RQ4, below. 
 
The model of privacy literacy illustrates overlap in the different knowledge areas and knowledge 
elements may have strong internal relations. For strong privacy literacy, these internal relations should 
be recognized, in addition to knowledge in the separate areas.  Assumedly insufficient knowledge 
about such relations was uncovered in analysis. 
An example of these relations is how a user's conception of a particular information element's 
sensitivity for misuse (Notion of information sensitivity, 5.2.4) expectedly is closely related to her 
understanding of threats (Knowledge of risks, 5.2.3):  who would find this information valuable and 
for what purpose? Knowing the information in need of protections requires updated knowledge about 
the risks relevant for its respective information category.  In analysis, several cases of insufficient 
knowledge about relations between threats and information categories were observed; the relation 
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from social engineering and coupling to expressive information, as mentioned previously, but also the 
relation between the risk for identity thefts and access to a complete profile of personal information 
about a user. Even if identity thefts was the most focused threat among participants, very few focused 
that the gathering of a complete profile of information of all three categories, like a Facebook profile, 
can be a highly valuable tool in the hands of a perpetrator. 
Another example of internal relations in the model of privacy literacy is the (assumed) relation 
between a user's experience of an interaction (Managing vulnerability, 5.4) and her Knowledge of 
risks (5.2.3). To what extent are users' willing to invest in prevention for a risk they experience as not 
relevant for their own privacy situation? Further research is needed to confirm the influence of a basic 
sense of security and invulnerability on users' privacy decisions, but as discussed for RQ2 (6.2), 
previous research, as well as findings of this study, point in this direction. 
 
CONCLUSION: Weak and improvable areas of privacy literacy were identified in the empirical 
analysis: aspects of the user experience like timeframe, goals, and the basic sense of security; a low 
focus on current risks like social engineering and coupling; a weak notion of sensitivity for misuse of 
the users' own, personal information in general, and for expressive information in particular; as well as 
a significant lack of understanding of the extensive sharing with third-parties. Insufficient knowledge 
about relations between the knowledge elements in the model of privacy literacy was observed, as 
well, like the relation between information sensitivity conceptions and risk awareness and the potential 
relation between the user experience and risk awareness. The weak and strong areas of privacy 
literacy observed for this study are illustrated in Figure 39 and summarized in Table 14.   
6.4 Privacy and age 
RQ4: Does teens' privacy literacy on Facebook differ from adults' privacy literacy? If so, how? 
 
 
The most significant age differences observed relates to the user EXPERIENCE (section 5.4) and 
informants' choice of information protection strategies, goals, and timeframe for the privacy process. 
Adults generally report self-censorship as their preferred, and only, information protection strategy. 
They are likely to focus self-presentation and the shaping of an online identity in a long-term 
perspective, and the potential public availability of information in the future is an important criterion 
for self-censorship. To a larger extent, youths report the use of several protection strategies; privacy 
settings are used to complement self-censorship. Youths are likely to focus their privacy process on 
the immediate need for protecting information against security threats and on preventing information 
from access outside an audience of their own choice ('the outsider threat', 2.2.1). 
 
As both perspectives have their pros and cons, it is not possible to claim that one is better suited to 
protect privacy than the other. A restrictive censorship for self-presentation focused on data 
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preservation in a long-term view is beneficial, as is the short-term view on protection against security 
threats and outsider's access to personal information, as well. Informants in both age groups would 
probably benefit from including aspects of the other group's perspective into their own view. And 
further, the current level of threats on Facebook (chapter 2) proposes an expansion of the repertoire of 
information protection strategies employed by both age groups. Combining many strategies
85
 would 
strengthen the level of information protection.  
 
As to measurements of rational, fact-based KNOWLEDGE, the most important differences observed 
relate to Knowledge of risks, where adults revealed a better understanding for commercial 
infringements of personal information (5.2.3.5), as well as of the risks associated to data persistence 
(Understanding exposure in general, 5.2.5.1). Youths appeared with a better understanding than adults 
of the privacy settings for Facebook core functionality (Understanding exposure in Facebook Core, 
5.2.5.2), yet no age differences were observed for privacy settings for third-parties (Understanding 
exposure in Facebook Platform, 5.3.2.1).  
 
As to BEHAVIOR, age differences were observed for the informants' actual exposure of personal 
information on Facebook. Youths' exposure to 'silent listeners' like third-parties, Facebook, and 
advertisers was significantly higher than for adults (Exposure in Facebook Platform, 5.3.2). A similar 
pattern was not observed for the measures for knowledge of exposure to third-parties (Understanding 
exposure in Facebook Platform, 5.3.2.1).  However, this may be explained by other knowledge 
factors, like the youths' weaker understanding of the problem of data persistence (Understanding 
exposure in general, 5.2.5.1) and their weaker understanding of the problem of commercial 
infringements of personal information (Knowledge of risks, 5.2.3.5). Another possible interpretation is 
to explain this difference by differences in the user experiences, like the stronger sense of security 
found for youths (a basic sense of security, 5.4.1) potentially influencing their privacy decisions 
negatively or by a different balancing of the trade-off usefulness/pleasure versus protection by youths 
and adults in the authorization process for third party applications. Users' decision process has not 
been investigated sufficiently in this study to confirm either of these latter explanations related to the 
user experience, though. 
 
Technology experience was indicated as potentially important for privacy literacy (5.2.1.1 and 
5.2.3.1). The two informants with short experience were both adults. Most adult participants in this 
study were quite experienced technology users, though, and the sample of users with low technology 
experience is too small to claim any age differences in this respect. To the extent that adults have less 
                                                          
 
85 like self-censorship; familiarize with the privacy settings; maintain settings regularly; use security functions whenever  
    available; employing well-considered password policies; and staying updated on relevant risks; etc. 
90 
 
technology experience than young people, this potentially leaves them more vulnerable to privacy 
issues.  
 
CONCLUSION: The most significant age differences observed for privacy literacy was revealed in the 
analysis of EXPERIENCE, and is related to the informants' choice of information protection strategies, 
goals, and timeframe for the privacy process. Self-censorship, self-presentation and potential publicity 
in a long-term perspective commonly characterize the adults' perspectives, whereas privacy settings, 
data protection, privacy, and immediacy are keywords typical for the youths' privacy process. Age 
differences were also observed in KNOWLEDGE, as adults appeared with a better understanding of the 
risks associated to the long-term preservation of data on the internet (data persistence) and to the 
commercial infringements of personal information. Youths appeared with a better understanding of the 
privacy settings for Facebook core functionality. As to BEHAVIOR, age differences were observed for 
the informants' actual exposure of personal information on Facebook, as youths' exposure to 'silent 
listeners' (third-parties, Facebook, and indirectly advertisers) was significantly higher than for adults. 
6.5 Reflections on the use of theory 
Two contributions dominate the theoretical perspective applied in this study; McCarthy and Wright 
(2004) by the structure provided by their four threads and six processes of the user experience; and 
Palen and Dourish (2003) by their descriptions of the dialectics and dynamics of the privacy process 
and the process boundaries of time, identity, and disclosure. Their contributions have supported a 
research focus on emotional as well as rational aspects of privacy and on the negotiations involved in 
the privacy process. These perspectives have allowed for nuances and for viewing data from different 
angles in data analysis.  
 
The main part of the analysis of experience was focused on uncovering the general ideas and 
mindsets overarching the users' Facebook interactions ('experience'). In this work, the theoretical 
concepts related to emotions, time, identity, and negotiation has been very useful and given valuable 
directions for the process. In the analysis of the concrete, limited experience informants had when 
reviewing their actual exposure in Facebook Platform ('an experience', section 5.3, 5.4), the six 
meaning-making processes and the sensual and compositional threads were of great support, as well. 
 
From the starting point described as '… what we would generally think of as cold computational 
processes – perceiving, thinking, reasoning, decision making, categorizing – are shot through with 
values, needs, desires, and goals' (McCarthy & Wright, 2004, p. 85), emotions have been a particular 
focus in this work. McCarthy & Wright's idea of the emotional thread has supported the research 
process from development of the interview guide through interviewing to data analysis. The data 
structure built in analysis came to reflect emotional elements as they appeared from the empirical 
material.  
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The time aspect is important in both perspectives and has been central in the data analysis. The 
temporality boundary and the spatio-temporal thread both focus the interplay between the past, the 
current, and the future in our aims to control the privacy process. This focus helped uncovering 
differences in youths' and adults' time perspectives; differences potentially relevant for their choices in 
the privacy context. Adults tend to orientate their decisions to the future to a larger extent than the 
youth. Basing their decisions of a more immediate time conception, youths' privacy processes are 
potentially more vulnerable to problems related to data persistence. The spatio-temporal thread further 
drew attention to the informants' in part diverging goals as to the use of Facebook for publicity versus 
privacy.  
The concept of identity is also captured by both perspectives. Technology use strengthens and 
shapes our identities; this process is relational and happens in dialogue with others; ‘self and other 
making sense of experience’ (John McCarthy & Peter  Wright, 2004, p. 107). The identity boundary 
reflects the purpose of controlling others' interpretations of our selves by displaying and shaping our 
identity in a continual process. Among adults, the investigation uncovered a tendency of self-
representation for the future and for potential publicity. For youths, identity is important as well, yet 
the goals for self-representation are more immediate and potentially related to an aim of presenting 
oneself to more limited social contexts. Data persistence and the desituating of information (lose time, 
place or intention in mediation - section 3.2) can disrupt the regulation of goals by the identity 
boundary. 
The disclosure boundary reflects the core process of controlling the disclosure of personal 
information, a process where the goals of privacy and publicity are in tension. Information disclosure 
by friends or third-parties and data persistence both have the potential to disrupt the regulation of this 
boundary. In this process, the adults expressed a tendency to focus on controlling the content of the 
information shared, whereas youth were more focused on controlling this boundary from an access/no 
access perspective.  
 
Through its focus on dialectics, applying the Privacy For a Networked World framework (Palen & 
Dourish, 2003) opened up for richer nuances in the empirical data. By viewing privacy as a continual 
negotiation process, opposites in the material became more obvious and room was given for the 
exploration of conflicting perspectives throughout the analysis process. The dichotomies 
usefulness/pleasure versus protection, and privacy versus publicity, both appeared as recurrent trade-
offs of the privacy process. This perspective made other opposites more visible, as well; like the 
tension between security and uncertainty in the general privacy experience, where security 'wins' the 
negotiation process assumedly supported by a main protection strategy, trust, a primary audience view, 
and the informants' conceptions of low vulnerability for themselves and their personal information.   
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The six sense-making processes of experience was found most helpful in directing the focus of the 
analysis of the concrete, limited experience ('an experience') informants had when reviewing their 
actual exposure in Facebook Platform (section 5.3, 5.4).  The compositional thread was apparent in the 
lack of understanding uncovered for transition between different privacy contexts on Facebook. The 
reactions in the review indicated that the compositional thread was broken, and technology did not 
support framing the user experience adequately.  
 
The conceptual separation of 'experience' from 'an experience' (Forlizzi & Battarbee, 2004)  was 
useful for the analysis of user experiences, and the study of secure experiences by Mathiasen and 
Bødker (2008) has been a major inspiration for the approach used in this work.   
6.6 Evaluating the study 
Qualitative studies can be argued to be subjective by nature. Awareness of the influence of values 
and biases is appropriate, especially in the processes of problem formulation, data analysis, and in 
presentation of the results (Walsham, 2006). A common set of criteria for assessment of scientific 
quality in qualitative studies is not yet agreed upon (Bryman, 2008)
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, however, some generally 
accepted guidelines for assessing quality in research can support the evaluation of studies. In this 
section I discuss the study in light of its application of theory (6.5.1), and by the concepts of validity, 
reliability, and reflexivity, as well as by some recommendations for the study of privacy in HCI 
(6.5.2). 
6.4.1 The role of theory 
Walsham (1995) separates between three ways of using theory in interpretive studies; as an initial 
guide to design and data collection; as part of an iterative process of data collection and analysis; as 
well as a final product of the research. The theoretical perspective chosen for this study (section 3.4) 
does not provide very thorough instructions for applying these contributions to the research process; 
however, despite the lack of detailed instructions, the theoretical perspective has been applied actively 
as a lens to view the world. This lens has provided useful support and directions for numerous 
thematic and methodological choices made throughout design and implementation of the research 
process.  
De Vaus (2001, ch. 1) describe two different styles of research based on the role of theory in the 
research process: theory testing (moving from the general to the particular by using deductive 
reasoning to build propositions from the theory and test if these are correct), and theory building 
                                                          
 
86 checklist for evaluation has been proposed by several researcher, the checklist of Malterud (2002) has been used to guide  
    this study 
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(making sense of observations, and using inductive reasoning to build a theory from these for later 
testing). The research process in this study has been data-driven and fits into the latter category. The 
rather strong empirical focus has made my own judgments important for the final results, and the 
process has some common features with the Grounded Theory perspective where 'researchers are 
encouraged to draw on their own theoretical backgrounds to help inform the study' (Sharp, et al., 2007, 
p. 390). However, the directions extracted from the selected theoretical perspective have been too 
pronounced to characterize this research process as Grounded Theory. 
6.4.2 Validity, reliability, and reflexivity 
Validity and reliability are generally accepted concepts in assessing scientific quality (Bryman, 
2008; Malterud, 2003; Sharp, et al., 2007). Validity concerns the degree of correspondence between 
the research questions and the empirical observations used to elucidate these (internal validity). Did 
the researcher collect empirical data relevant for the research questions? Reliability is about accuracy 
in the process of collecting and analyzing data. Would the study, when replicated by other researchers, 
yield the same results? The idea of reflexivity supplements the concepts of validity and reliability. This 
concept grasps the reflectiveness of social researchers to the potential influences on results from their 
'methods, values, biases, decisions, and mere presence in the very situations they investigate' (Bryman, 
2008, p. 698). And finally, the concept of validity further includes an evaluation of the study’s degree 
of transferability to others parts of reality (external validity). External validity requires internal 
validity, reliability, as well as reflexivity in the conduct of research. The following paragraphs reviews 
some aspects related to these concepts. 
6.4.2.1 Internal validity 
Research design is associated to the logical structure of the inquiry, and the purpose of creating a 
good research design is to reduce ambiguity of the research evidence. (De Vaus, 2001, ch. 1). The 
research questions and the analysis approach of this study were refined gradually throughout the 
research process to increase the quality of this design. The fundamental logical structure was not 
subject to major changes in these iterations, though.  
Several measures were taken throughout the research process, to capture data relevant for the 
research questions. The data collection arrangements were gradually developed with useful support by 
the study participants. Several data collection methods were tested and a variety of interviewing 
techniques were triangulated, tested and applied. The phenomenon in question was studied from 
several perspectives (knowledge, behavior, and experience) in order to strengthen quality of the final 
results. In data analysis, qualitative and quantitative analysis approaches were triangulated, and data 
suitable for comparisons were extracted. These measures assumedly strengthen the validity of the 
research results.  
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Some challenges relate to the chosen research strategy. When approaching qualitative data 
quantitatively, results potentially relocate too far from their originating contexts. In order to prevent 
this, continual recontextualizations of results to raw data was emphasized in both phases of the data 
analysis. Another potential challenge relates to the lack of sufficiently rich information provided by 
the sample in data collection. The iterative sampling and analysis approach chosen for the study 
usually contribute in preventing this problem of reaching the point of saturation prematurely. In the 
first, qualitative part of the data analysis common features in the data material were observed, these 
were interpreted as indicating clear tendencies in the empirical material. This observation encouraged 
the decision to go on with a second, more quantitative analysis phase. However, an alternative 
interpretation of this observation might be that the point of saturation was reached prematurely due to 
insufficient diversity in the research sample. As the sample was varied regarding to age, experiences, 
gender, as well as occupational backgrounds, and size-wise was not small for a qualitative study, the 
first interpretation is assumed for the project. 
6.4.2.2 Validity in studies of privacy 
Potential problems concerning data validity associate to the study of users' attitudes, as these are 
problematic to get access to and to categorize. In order to transcend the discrepancy between attitudes 
and behavior commonly experienced within studies of privacy, Iachello and Hong (2007) emphasize 
the need to balance directly asking about privacy to observations of the users' behavior. They suggest 
the use of techniques providing sufficient context as well as concrete situations, in order to get closer 
to the users' experiences: '…personal privacy dynamics should be investigated with studies that closely 
simulate the experience of the users, rather than on a hypothetical basis' (2007, p. 29). Howe, et al. 
(2012) also point out this need to check intention versus actual behavior, and recommends accessing 
the emotional reactions of users through for example the use of simulation based techniques.  
 
This study applied various techniques to prevent the problem of attitudes potentially deviating from 
behavior: 1) asking directly about the informants' privacy understandings and preferences; 2) asking 
indirectly by exemplifying other users' understandings and preferences (impersonal scenarios); 3) 
asking indirectly by asking informants to view themselves through the eyes of others; 4) observing 
static aspects of behavior (walkthrough of privacy settings), as well as 5) observing immediate 
behavior by studying the reactions related to the walkthrough of privacy settings and actual exposure. 
Applying this selection of methodological angles and techniques provided richer data than expected 
from simply asking directly about privacy, and yielded information of rational, fact-based privacy 
knowledge, as well as of reflections and emotional reactions of potential importance for this 
knowledge.  
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Investigating the phenomenon from three angles of KNOWLEDGE, BEHAVIOR, and EXPERIENCE are 
expected to strengthen the validity of results. To illustrate benefits of cross-checking the analysis of 
knowledge against actual behavior, weighted averages was computed for the values in Figure 15, Figure 
25 and Figure 31. These figures all picture the informants' understanding exposure in Facebook 
Platform
87
, yet approach this knowledge from different angles
88
. Weighted averages for each approach 
reflected a high-medium level of knowledge from Figure 15, medium-high from Figure 25, and medium-low 
from Figure 31. This shows how the evaluation of knowledge was gradually developed and 
strengthened throughout the analysis.  
6.4.2.3 Reliability 
Due to the nature of the research process and the empirical data, the replicability requirement does 
not have the same relevance for the qualitative study as for quantitative research. However, it is 
important that the researcher organize the qualitative research process allowing for a future 
investigator to understand this process as well as the conclusions drawn for results.  
The research process of this study has been systematically documented by use of several tools. This 
documentation on various formats allows for better traceability in the future, yet has supported quality 
in the current process, as well. In the presentation of results, it has been an aim to detail aspects of the 
process properly, from problem description and theoretical frame of reference, to sampling strategy 
and procedures for analysis of empirical data.  
 
Some comments apply to the measurement of knowledge and behavior in particular. The 
procedures applied for measuring of knowledge (described in 4.4.2.5) are relatively simple
89
. More 
advanced methods for measuring would probably be required if the results were to demonstrate a high 
level of knowledge by informants. Aiming at uncovering lack of knowledge, like here, these 
procedures are assumed as sufficient. And further, the analysis of exposure (section 5.3) is 
concentrated on the informants' explicit protection of information, as well as on their authorization of 
others' access to information. These measures are assumed as relevant indicators of actual exposure in 
the context of this study, but would probably be insufficient as measures for the informants' actual risk 
level on Facebook.  
  
                                                          
 
87 Figure 15 includes knowledge from both Figure 24 and Figure 25, which have relatively similar patterns of results 
88 Figure 15 = self-reports; Figure 25 = measurements based on examples of other peoples application activity;  
    Figure 31 = measurements based on the informants' own behavior 
89 for example, Knowledge of risks are measured by self-reports adjusted for a qualitative impression of what risks the  
    informants' know of and which seems to concern them the most. More aspects are potentially important when aiming at  
    demonstrating a high level of risk knowledge, like knowledge of safe practice, what actions participants take to address  
    known risks, etc. 
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6.4.2.4 Reflexivity 
A general challenge in interpretive studies is to understand social meanings, the meaning-making 
processes, and the contexts within witch it all takes place (Walsham, 1995). The process of 
interpreting the informants' meaning-making is inseparable from the researcher’s own interpretations 
of the world, and also, as even a simple human action like a twitch by the eye can have several 
interpretations, the final results represent second- (or even third-) order interpretations of social 
phenomena (Geertz, 1973, ch. 1). This has implications for our understanding of the empirical data, as 
'what we call our data are really our own constructions of other people’s constructions of what they 
and their compatriots are up to' (1973, p. 9). The role of the qualitative researcher is inherently 
subjective due to the subjective character of qualitative data collection and analysis, but also due to the 
researcher’s sharing of concepts and interpretations in the interview context which potentially 
influences the informants’ own interpretations (Iachello & Hong, 2007; Malterud, 2002; Walsham, 
1995).  
 
The theoretical perspective described in section 3.4 reflects some fundamental premises for this 
work. In the practical research process, I have been aware of the participants’ statements and actions 
as potentially arising from cultural, social, or linguistic contexts different from my own. The 
information provided to participants in the interview context was aimed to balance against the ethical 
requirement of taking care of the participants’ interests and integrity. I also tried constantly 
considering my own role in the interview process. The relation between the empirical material and the 
interpretations of this material was attended to by thorough transcriptions and by recurrent 
recontextualizations of findings to the empirical data throughout the process of analysis and 
presentation of results. 
6.4.2.5 External validity 
The methodological choices for this study have consequences for its degree of transferability of 
results to other parts of reality. Qualitative interviews usually do not scale well (Iachello & Hong, 
2007). The use of a strategic sample
90
 introduces a subjective element into the research process, which 
leave the empirical findings as not generalizable to a population. The results potentially have some 
transferability as to concepts, though (Bryman, 2008; Malterud, 2002; Norwegian Committees for 
Research Ethics, 2011). To increase the external validity of this work, the sample and the principles 
for the sampling process are described in the paragraphs 4.1.1 and 4.4.1.2, as well as in section 5.1. A 
model of privacy literacy is suggested, and this models potential relevance for behavior is indicated by 
                                                          
 
90 a purposively selected sample from the phenomenon’s sampling frame, as opposed to a representative sample, i.e. a sample 
    that reflects the population accurately (Bryman, 2008) 
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the weak and strong areas of the informants' privacy literacy described. These findings can be useful 
on a conceptual level, and also their transferability can be increased by further testing in a study of 
more generalizable character. This study does not claim generalizability as such. 
 
The above evaluation of research quality finalizes the presentation in this chapter. Potential issues 
related to the research process have been brought forward, as well as some actual measures taken to 
pursue quality throughout the process. However, as Walsham (2006) point out: a good process is 
important, yet the most important criterion of quality in all research is its capability to provide 
interesting research results. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 A model of privacy literacy 
Investigating privacy decisions from several perspectives (KNOWLEDGE, BEHAVIOR, and 
EXPERIENCE) provided more rich insights into the informants' behavior in privacy related situations.  
This work proposes a model for privacy literacy 
(Figure 40 and Figure 41) reflecting relations between 
users' rational, fact-based knowledge, features of the 
user experience, and the privacy decisions they make 
in interactions with technology.  
 
Application of the model in empirical analysis 
uncovered areas of privacy knowledge in need for 
improvement: aspects of the user experience like 
timeframe, goals, and the basic sense of security; a 
low focus on current risks like social engineering and 
coupling; a significant lack of understanding of the 
extensive sharing with third-parties, as well as a weak 
notion of sensitivity for misuse of the users' own, personal information in general and expressive 
information, like preferences, 'likes', and interests,  in particular.  
 
 
 
Figure 40: A model of privacy literacy 
Figure 41: A model of privacy literacy: description of knowledge elements 
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The analysis further found features of the users' experiences of privacy in disharmony with their 
actual privacy situation on Facebook. To the extent that users' sense of security and invulnerability 
influences their privacy decisions, this may introduce problems for privacy and their aim to behave 
cautiously. This situation may explain some lack of rationality observed in privacy decisions. 
 
Some think of privacy problems as related to users' recklessness and negligence. This study found 
users expressing an explicit desire to behave cautiously online and recognizing a responsibility for 
protecting their personal information against misuse. Still, entertainment, usefulness, and pleasure are 
primary purposes for technology use and expectedly weighty factors in the balancing act of privacy 
decisions. Supportive designs and well-informed education of users are both important associates for 
users aiming to reach their desired level of privacy. 
7.2 Recommendations and further research 
Findings supports the trend (Howe, et al., 2012), that users have a relatively low focus on typical 
security terms. In education, avoiding a too strong focus on these can be advantageous. Additionally, 
findings suggest educators to communicate information about privacy and security to users by 
focusing concrete examples of incidents to invite closeness and identification, as well as focusing the 
actual consequences a threat may impose for user's own information and situation. 
  
Based on this analysis, users are recommended to think of data protection in a long-term as well as 
a short-term time perspective. They are encouraged to combine a number of different information 
protection strategies (like self-censorship; familiarize with the privacy settings; maintain settings 
regularly; use security functions whenever available; employing well-considered password policies; 
etc.), and to continually update their knowledge of current risks and information vulnerabilities. A 
strengthened knowledge about the actors and driving forces for commercial infringements of personal 
information would be advantageous, for youths in particular. 
 
Investigations of the details of the privacy decision process will be needed in the future to confirm 
the influence of user experiences on actual privacy behavior. A useful track would be to test the 
influence of a basic sense of security and invulnerability on actual privacy decisions. This theme calls 
for qualitative research in the first place, and the theoretical perspective of this study is expected to be 
particularly supportive for this purpose. Making use of this perspective has been informative and 
inspiring. Further elaboration and testing of the model (or elements of the model) for privacy literacy 
on a wider, representative sample would be an interesting next step, as well. 
 
Another track is investigating the importance of former experiences (concrete experiences in the 
past) for privacy decisions. This study has indicated an importance of concrete experiences for 
behavior (5.4).  
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And further, the strong focus on identity and contextual integrity observed in analysis, among 
adults in particular, suggests a closer look into the importance of users' recognition of context in 
interactions. The importance of identity
91
 for social interactions and of context
92
 for privacy 
interactions has been described previously, and the tendency observed to focus a mere subset of the 
actual audience in sharing decisions (chapter 2 and section 5.4) points to users' recognition of context 
as an aspect relevant for further studies.  
 
The importance of user experiences for privacy decisions calls for inclusion of experiences in 
usability considerations for technology design. Approaching design from an experiential perspective 
requires a widening of the design horizon to include aspects like goals, time, place, emotions, social 
interaction, and dialectics. 
 
Previous research has shown how Facebook design influenced users' privacy negatively by 
introducing unexpected changes in their privacy settings (e.g.Stutzman & Kramer-Duffield, 2010). 
This work identified problems associated with the separation of privacy contexts by Facebook's main 
architectural building blocks. In order to frame users' privacy experiences adequately, it is 
recommended that architectural features are made visible in the user interface design to the extent that 
these affects the mechanisms for information control. And further, accentuating and visualizing 
aspects of users' privacy situation in design would help directing users' focus to the need for 
information protection, informing their privacy decisions, and supporting the balancing and trade-offs 
typically characterizing their privacy situations. After all, privacy will always be subordinated the 
primary purposes of users' interactions, and expectedly; the more support from design for this 
secondary process, the more pleasure and usefulness for users in their interactions with technology. 
I am in there because I find its usefulness higher than its problems, you know…Yes, it is a nice 
thing, Facebook… absolutely (#37:A3M) 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
 
91 Erving Goffman: The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) 
92 e.g. Helen Nissenbaum: Privacy in context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (2010) 
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Planleggingsfasen: 
Hva er det jeg ønsker å få vite noe om? 
Hvorfor deler vi store mengder personlig informasjon i sosiale medier til tross for 
at vi uttrykker bekymring med hensyn til konsekvensene av å dele? 
Er det forskjell på unge og eldres opplevelser og beslutninger relatert til privacy 
på Facebook? 
Hovedfokus: Privacy Literacy (inkl. både kunnskap og læring): 
Skille mellom ferdighetsaspekter (kompetanse) og læringsaspekter (dannelse): 
 Å bruke digitale verktøy er en ferdighet den enkelte må tilegne seg, 
vedlikeholde og kontinuerlig utvikle, for å bli en digitalt kompetent og kritisk 
innbygger. Evne til kildekritikk og vurdering av innhold er del av digital 
kompetanse (eNorge, i Egeberg et al.) 
 Vi vet lite om kunnskapens betydning for våre faktiske valg. Blir den omsatt til 
refleksjon og etisk kompetanse, slik at vi forstår hva vi gjør i den enkelte 
delingssituasjon? 
 Kunnskap som gjenspeiles i innsikt, erfaring og opplevelser, som påvirker vår 
tenkemåte og oppfatning av verden . Almenngyldige kunnskaper som har 
mulighet for å skape strukturer og prinsipper som har overføringsverdi (Klafki) 
 
Antakelse 1: Facebookbrukere med gode kunnskaper om digital informasjon, 
ansvarsforhold, farer på internett og generell teknologikunnskap, 
beskytter sin personlige informasjon bedre enn brukere som har 
mindre gode kunnskaper. 
Antakelse 2: Facebookbrukere som har erfaring med uønsket deling av personlig 
informasjon, beskytter informasjonen sin bedre enn brukere som ikke 
har slike erfaringer. 
Antakelse 3: Facebookbrukere som både har kunnskaper og erfaring beskytter 
informasjonen sin bedre enn de to førstnevnte gruppene. 
Antakelse 4: Unge Facebookbrukere har bedre kunnskap og mer erfaring med 
uønskete hendelser, og beskytter sin personlige informasjon bedre 
enn eldre brukere. 
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For å ta stilling til disse påstandene må jeg vite noe om: 
 brukerens kunnskap om teknologi, informasjon, ansvarsforhold og farer på internett 
o må ha deltakere med ulikt kunnskapsnivå 
 
 brukerens grad av erfaring med negative hendelser som følge av uønsket deling av 
personlig informasjon på nettet 
o må ha deltakere med ulik grad av erfaring med uønsket deling 
 
 hvor godt brukeren beskytter sin personlige informasjon i sosiale medier 
o vurder om dette er godt nok dekket i intervjuguiden 
 
 brukerens alder 
Hvorfor ønsker jeg å studere dette? 
Det viktigste formålet med studien er å utforske avviket mellom holdninger 
og atferd i forbindelse med deling av informasjon i sosiale medier 
o bidra til å forklare avviket, med fokus på subjektive komponenter og user 
experience  
o bidra til økt kunnskap om kompetansebyggingsbehov med tanke på tryggere 
atferd på nett (hva og hvordan) 
Forslag til tema i intervjuguiden: 
 
Tema 1: Bakgrunnsinformasjon om deltakerens Facebookbruk 
Tema 2: Ferdighetsaspektet: Kunnskap & kompetanse 
1. Kunnskap om farer (privacy og security – ikke klar grense mellom disse) 
- deler fordi vi ikke har kunnskap om farer  
 
2. Teknologiforståelse 
- deler fordi vi ikke forstår  
o hvordan personvernmekanismene fungerer (usability) 
o hvordan pc & internett generelt fungerer 
o hvem som har/tar ansvaret for å ivareta vårt personvern 
 
3. Informasjonsforståelse 
- deler fordi vi ikke forstår viralitet og bestandighet 
- deler fordi vi ikke forstår ulike typer av informasjon 
Tema 3: Dannelsesaspektet: Subjektiv opplevelse, refleksjon, motivasjon 
1. Nærhet til farer /subjektiv opplevelse av farer (user experience) 
- erfaringer, forventninger, følelser, holdninger, verdier, time/place 
(nåtid, fortid, fremtid)… 
- bekymring: er vi bekymret? i hvilken grad? for hva? når er vi spesielt 
bekymret? hva gjør vi for å redusere bekymringen? deler vi likevel? 
-’det hender ikke meg’? 
 
2. Motivasjon for å forstå privacy og for å lære om privacy 
Tema 4: Dannelsesaspektet: Atferd / holdninger i konkrete situasjoner 
1. Holdninger til konkrete situasjoner (scenarier, eksempler) 
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